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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current decade has witnessed the rise in corporate law 
scholarship of a new, political account of corporate law. Like most 
existing corporate law scholarship, the new account focuses on the 
characteristic dilemma in American corporate governance: the fact 
that shareholders of publicly held firms are often too widely dispersed 
to effectively monitor the firm's managers. This separation of owner-
ship and control, which was most famously documented by Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means in the early 1930s, 1 has long been 
attributed to economic necessity. In the traditional account, firms' 
need for enormous amounts of new capital at the end of the 
nineteenth century required them to attract the savings of vast 
numbers of investors, who necessarily delegated control to a 
professional class of managers. 
1. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) . 
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The great contribution of the new wave in corporate law 
scholarship has been to demonstrate that the characteristic pattern 
we see in U.S. corporations stems as much from political factors as 
from economic necessity. By carefully exploring the historical 
development of American corporate law, Mark Roe and others have 
shown that legislative restrictions on banks and other financial 
institutions have played an important role in fragmenting the 
ownership of American firms. 2 In their comparative mode, these 
scholars have pointed out that large shareholders actively monitor the 
managers of Japanese and German firms, underscoring the possibility 
that things might have developed differently in the United States. :J 
This new scholarship has already offered enormous insights 
into American corporate governance, yet it has almost completely 
neglected a critical component of corporate law: the role of corporate 
bankruptcy.4 Only by considering t he relationship between corporate 
law and corporate bankruptcy can we fully understand how corporate 
law functions in the United States, and why American corporate law 
differs so dramatically from its counterparts in Japan, Germany, and 
other nations. 
Based on this insight, this Article attempts to develop a more 
complete explanation of the mechanisms of corporate law than the 
existing literature offers. 5 The analysis will operate, in a sense, at 
two different levels. At an abstract level, the Article will develop a 
general theory of corporate law, which takes into account both corpo-
rate governance-broadly construed to include political as well as 
legal factors, and the way managers and other constituencies respond 
to them6-and corporate bankruptcy. In particular, it will argue that 
2. Roe, who has been the most prominent exponent of the political account, recently pub-
lished an influential book based on a series of earlier articles . See MARK J. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS ( 1994) [hereinafter ROE, STRONG MANAGERS]. 
3. The occasion for much of this analysis has been the increasing concentration of 
American stock in the hands of institutional investors, and the question whether institutional 
investor activism will alter the traditional pattern of strong managers and passive shareholders. 
For further discussion and citations to the literature, see infra notes 247-53 and accompanying 
text. 
4. The neglect is especially puzzling with Mark Roe, given that he wrote several impor-
tant articles on bankruptcy issues earlier in his career. See, e.g., Mark J . Roe, Bankruptcy and 
Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983). 
5. For earlier works by the Author emphasizing the importance to corporate law of 
corporate bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel , Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in 
Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) [hereinafter Skeel, Nature] ; David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 471 (1994) [hereinafter Skeel, Rethinking]. 
6. This Article will focus on the institutional environment as a whole, or what Lance 
Davis and Douglass North have characterized as ''the set of fundamental political, social a nd 
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corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy complement one 
another, such that changes in firms' characteristic approach to corpo-
rate governance in any given country will provoke changes in corpo-
rate bankruptcy, and vice versa. 7 
To show this, the Article will focus on corporate governance 
patterns in the United States, on the one hand, and in Japan and 
Germany on the other, which stand at opposite ends of the corporate 
governance spectrum.8 In the United States, corporate governance is 
characterized by relatively passive shareholders,9 well-developed 
managerial labor markets, and market correctives such as hostile 
takeovers, combined with a bankruptcy framework that permits the 
managers of distressed firms to attempt a reorganization. I refer to 
this approach as an "ex post" system, due to the after-the-fact nature 
of the correctives. In Japan and Germany, by contrast, large 
shareholders such as banks, rather than hostile takeovers, typify 
corporate governance, managerial labor markets are comparatively 
thin, and managers are immediately displaced if a firm files for 
bankruptcy. I refer to this approach as an "ex ante" system. 10 
The argument that corporate law and bankruptcy are comple-
mentary suggests that if U.S. governance combined active takeover 
markets with a bankruptcy law that, as in Japan and Germany, 
legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution." LANCE 
E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 6 (1971). 
The Article will sometimes use "corporate law" as a synonym for corporate governance-that 
is, to connote not just the background laws, but also the governance patterns the parties adopt. 
Also, although I distinguish throughout the Article between corporate governance (or corporate 
law) and corporate bankruptcy for expositional purposes, the larger point is, of course, that cor-
porate bankruptcy is a component of corporate governance. 
7. As discussed in much more detail in Part II.C, I borrow the concept of complementar-
ity from important recent work in the corporate finance literature. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & 
John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in 
Manufacturing, 19 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1995). 
8. Although I focus on the United States, Japan, ar1d Germany both because of my own 
familiarity with American corporate law and because Japan and Germany offer a vivid contrast, 
the analysis is intended to be general in application. I elaborate on this, and offer brief com-
ments on Canada, France, and Great Britain in the conclusion to the Article. 
9. I say "relatively" because institutional shareholders have taken a more active stance 
in recent years. 
10. The terms "ex post" and "ex ante" roughly parallel what some commentators have 
characterized as "market-centered" and "bank-centered" systems. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, 
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 327, 328 (1996). For evidence that other aspects of Japanese regulation also have an ex 
ante focus as compared to the U.S., see Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal 
of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L 
Bus. L. 569, 584-85 (1991) (ex ante emphasis of Japanese administrative law). 
My use of the term "system" is meant to be metaphorical only. I do not attribute intentional 
qualities to the systems, as some recent scholars have done in other contexts. See, e.g., Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the liability "system"). 
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immediately displaced managers, the managers of healthy firms 
would have an incentive to encourage investors to acquire large, 
stable stakes in American firms, and investors could expect profits 
from assembling such stakes. Similarly, if Japanese and German 
firms shifted toward American shareholding patterns, we could expect 
to see an analogous shift in their bankruptcy regimes. 
As this description suggests, my theory does not assert that 
lawmakers will necessarily alter the legal frameworks of corporate 
law and corporate bankruptcy at the same time and in complemen-
tary fashion. Instead, it suggests that firms' overall approach to cor-
porate law, including both the regulatory background and managers' 
and investors' responses to it, is integrally related to the nature of the 
corresponding bankruptcy regime. 
One way to test this framework will be to see if its predictions 
hold true in the future-that is, if changes in a nation's corporate 
governance are accompanied by changes in corporate bankruptcy and 
vice versa. The best way to shed light on why American corporate 
governance looks so different from the approaches in Japan and 
Germany, however, and to make predictions about whether we can 
expect to see substantial change, is to explore the historical antece-
dents of the patterns we see now. Once the general theory has been 
developed, the Article moves to this second, more particularized level 
of analysis. 
The Article focuses in most detail on the institutional 
factors-interest group activity, structural constraints, and 
ideology-that have helped to produce the characteristic pattern of 
U.S. corporate governance: the Berle-Means corporation in corporate 
governance and manager-driven, negotiated reorganization in 
bankruptcy. On the corporate law side, much of this story has been 
told in the important recent work described at the outset of the 
Article. What has not been explained is how corporate reorganization 
emerged in this country, and how its emergence relates to the 
development of corporate law. 
As with the Berle-Means corporation, it was not at all inevita-
ble that U.S. law would evolve toward a manager-driven, reor-
ganization-based bankruptcy regime. Until the railroad failures of 
the nineteenth century, financial distress routinely meant liquidation. 
Reorganization inight never have developed if institutional factors 
had not prevented Congressional intervention. Railroad failures 
prompted the creation of a judicial reorganization technique known as 
equity receivership, which only later gave way to legislative regula-
tion of corporate reorganization. Legislative regulation occurred in 
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two very different steps during the New Deal and took its current 
form as a result of a series of events beginning in the 1950s.U 
In each of these accounts, the story is one of adaptive evolu-
tion. Changes in the relevant legal regimes have been central, but 
managers' and investors' responses to these changes prove equally 
salient. 12 From the interplay between the parties and the 
institutional context in which they operate, we see the characteristic 
patterns of ex ante (in Japan and Germany) and ex post (in the United 
States) governance develop. 
Mter describing the emergence of ex post governance in the 
U.S., the Article offers a more concise account of the developments 
responsible for the very different ex ante approaches that characterize 
Japanese and German corporate governance. The discussion suggests 
that historical and political influences have played similarly 
important roles in both Japan and Germany. 
The historical analysis leads to several additional issues. One 
is the question of whether the American ex post approach and the ex 
ante systems in Japan and Germany are likely to be stable; or 
whether we can expect them to converge over time. Although some 
commentators predict that the continued expansion of international 
markets will blur the existing distinctions in corporate governance, 
this Article's analysis of various institutional factors suggests that the 
respective systems will remain surprisingly stable. 
This is not to say that one of the two systems is now and will 
continue to be superior to the other. Both approaches appear 
generally to be efficient and to have characteristic biases. For in-
stance, ex ante governance eliminates the costs of a manager-driven, 
ex post reorganization process and may enhance the information 
exchange between managers and shareholders, but it can also chill 
managerial risk-taking and adaptation to changing technologies. Ex 
post governance encourages risk-taking, but may also lead to exces-
sive risk and related problems, such as inadequate investment by 
11. Interestingly, and in contrast to the political history of corporate governance, the sin-
gle most important interest group in American bankruptcy law has been lawyers. Throughout 
the equity receivership period, reorganization practice was centered on a small, elite segment of 
the Wall Street bar. One of the most dramatic effects of the New Deal bankruptcy reforms was 
to transform the nature of bankruptcy practice in ways that continue to resonate. 
12. This Article's emphasis on managers' and investors' response to an existing legal 
regime illustrates an important distinction between evolutionary theory in biology and in law. 
Legal evolution is less "random," since human actors can consciously reflect on the institutional 
environment to which they are responding. See generally E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary 
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Politics, 
Adaptation and Change in Corporate Law 4-6 (1998) (unpublished draft, on file with author). As 
will become clear, intentionality plays a crucial role in the evolutionary theory of this Article. 
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employees in firm-specific human capital. This Article argues that 
the two approaches (and variations between these poles) are best seen 
not as efficient or inefficient, but as alternative mechanisms for 
enhancing going-concern value. 13 
This Article's conclusions as to the stability and respective 
merits of the two systems have important implications for the recent 
calls for U.S. lawmakers to emulate Japanese and German-style 
governance, and for Japan and Germany to adopt aspects of the 
American system. Most obviously, adjustments to one element of 
corporate governance-such as inducements for relational sharehold-
ing in U.S. firms or the adoption of U.S.-style corporate 
reorganization in Germany-are unlikely to take hold absent corre-
sponding changes to the remainder of the system. Therefore the 
efforts in recent years by teams of lawyers and academics to export 
aspects of American corporate or bankruptcy law are unlikely to be 
successful. On the other hand, cross-fertilization of this sort has on 
occasion produced fruitful results, and failed efforts are often more 
ineffectual than harmful. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the political 
account of American corporate governance and the very different 
governance patterns in Japan and Germany, and develops my theory 
as to the complementarity of corporate law and corporate bankruptcy; 
Parts III and IV provide a historical analysis of how ex post 
governance emerged in the United States, whereas firms in Japan 
and Germany gravitated toward ex ante governance-focusing in 
particular on the development of an ex post bankruptcy regime in the 
United States; and Part V considers the stability of the respective 
systems and the question of whether one or the other is superior. 
II. THE CORPORATE LAW/BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
The standard economic account of American corporate law 
characterizes the publicly held corporation as a nexus of contracts. 14 
This account has encouraged theorists to focus less on the corporate 
13. This is a good place to note an important caveat. It remains unclear how large an ef-
fect any given corporate governance framework has on economic performance. Technological 
changes and external shocks almost certainly play a greater role. Thus, the efficiency effects of 
a nation's corporate governance approach will often be on the margin. 
14. The nexus of contracts perspective dates back to Ronald Coase's seminal work, Ronald 
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), but it did not become widely influ-
ential until the more recent work of Eugene Fama and others. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). 
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entity as an "entity," and more on the wide array of contractual rela-
tionships into which the firm enters. While much of corporate law 
theory examines the relationship between the managers of the firm 
and its shareholders, contracts with other suppliers of capital, 
employees , and consumers also play an important role. 
In contrast to the earlier literature, which tended to view these 
contracts solely in economic terms, recent scholars have begun to pay 
close attention to historical, political, cultural, and regulatory influ-
ences on corporate contracting. 15 What has emerged is a far more 
nuanced explanation of corporate governance, one that has already 
paid enormous dividends. Rather surprisingly, however, this litera-
ture regularly ignores corporate bankruptcy. In this Part, I argue 
that, by adding bankruptcy to the analysis, we can develop a more 
complete theoretical account of corporate governance than currently 
exists. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. The first step describes 
recent developments in our understanding of corporate governance. 
The second step adds bankruptcy to the analysis in order to develop a 
more complete theory of the evolution of corporate law-a theory that 
casts new light on the differences between American corporate gov-
ernance and the frameworks in place in Germany and Japan. 
A. The Political Account of Corporate Governance 
As economic theorists have explored the nexus of contracts 
that comprise a corporation, they have returned again and again to a 
single issue: the role of agency costs. 16 Simply put, agency costs are 
the costs that arise due to conflicts of interest between a principal and 
her agent. If the managers (the agents of shareholders and the 
corporation) pursue their own interests-such as leisure or perks, or 
their own prestige-rather than the interests of shareholders (the 
principal), shareholders suffer the consequences. Much of corporate 
15. The most recent work in this vein has asked whether the evolution of corporate law is 
"path dependant" and thus potentially inefficient. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 10, at 329; 
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 
815-25 (1995); Mark J . Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
641, 641 (1996). 
16. Jensen and Meckling popularized the term "agency costs" in an article whose impor-
tance is difficult to overstate. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
Jensen and Meckling defined the total agency costs arising from a principal-agent relationship 
as the sum of "(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by 
the agent, (3) the residual loss." Id. at 308. 
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law and of the parties' own contractual arrangements can be seen as 
efforts to minimize these agency costs. 
The principal focus throughout the Article will be on the con-
flicts of interest between the managers and the shareholders of a 
corporation-that is, managerial agency costs. However, there are 
two additional kinds of perverse incentives that will also come into 
play. The first stems from shareholders' incentives. If a firm's capital 
structure includes debt, shareholders may encourage the firm's man-
agers to pursue excessively risky strategies, due to the fact that 
shareholders will receive all of the benefits of a successful gamble but 
will share the costs of a failure with the firm's debtholders. 17 
Second, to the extent creditors influence corporate governance, 
they too may have perverse incentives. Just as shareholders have an 
incentive to encourage too much risk, debtholders prefer that the firm 
take too little risk-that is, that it eschew even some risks where the 
benefits exceed the costs. 18 
The standard history of corporate law centers on managerial 
agency costs. In the early 1930s, Berle and Means inaugurated 
modern corporate law scholarship by showing that the rise of the 
publicly held corporation in America had produced a deep separation 
17. In the corporate finance literature, perverse incentives of this sort are referred to as 
an "overinvestment" problem. See generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate 
Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (discussing perverse incentives). 
Consider a simple example. Suppose that Firm's current assets are worth $100; it owes $80 
to Creditor; and Shareholder's stock is worth $20. Firm must decide whether to spend its $100 
of assets on a business opportunity with a 10 percent chance of success. If the opportunity is 
successful, Firm will be worth $800, but if it fails, Firm's value will drop to $10. A moment's 
reflection makes clear that Firm should forgo the opportunity. The opportunity has an expected 
value of ($800)(.10) + ($10)(.90) = $80.90. Since it would cost $100, Firm should not pursue it. 
Shareholder will see the opportunity quite differently however. Although the opportunity 
reduces the value of Creditor's interest, it increases the value of Shareholder's interest from $20 
to $72. (The expected value of Shareholder's interest if the opportunity succeeds is ($800 -
$80)(.10) = $72, and the expected value in the event of failure is $0 (with the $10 firm value 
going to Creditor)). Shareholder therefore will encourage Firm's managers to pursue the 
opportunity. 
In addition to the overinvestment problem, shareholder decision making may be subject to 
an "underinvestment" or "debt overhang" problem if the firm becomes insolvent. The problem is 
that shareholders may forgo even positive present-value opportunities if their interest would 
remain underwater even in the event of a successful outcome. See id. at 149-54. 
18. As in the example given in the previous footnote, assume that Firm owes Creditor $80 
and its assets currently are worth $100. This time, however, assume that Firm must decide 
whether to spend the $100 to pursue an opportunity with 50 percent probability of success, and 
whose values are $200 if successful and $50 if unsuccessful. Because the overall value of the 
opportunity is $125, Firm should pursue it. If Creditor were making the decision, however (and 
Shareholder could not offer a side payment to Creditor), Creditor would eschew the opportunity, 
since it diminishes the value of Firm's obligations to Creditor from $80 to $65 . (This is because 
there is a 50 percent chance Creditor will be paid the full $80-ifthe prospect is successful-and 
a 50 percent chance of receiving only $50; thus, ($80)(.50) + ($50)(.50) = $65.) 
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between ownership and control. 19 Although shareholders theoretically 
owned the corporations, shareholdings in large corporations were so 
widely scattered that shareholders exerted little influence. Because of 
shareholders' inability to coordinate-which now would be described 
as a "collective action problem"-managers had free rein to run the 
corporations however they saw fit. 20 
Subsequent commentators have assumed that the Berle-Means 
corporation is economically inevitable. They reason that sharehold-
ings will become increasingly dispersed as corporations grow in size 
because shareholders wish to limit their holdings in any given firm in 
order to diversify their interests. 
Certainly the most intriguing development in recent corporate 
law scholarship is the suggestion that the Berle-Means corporation, 
with its separation of ownership and control, may owe its existence as 
much to politics and history as to economics. Mark Roe and others 
have argued that the peculiarities of American regulation of financial 
intermediaries played a pivotal role in the emergence and survival of 
the Berle-Means corporation. 21 
1. Politics, Finance, and the Berle-Means Corporation 
The political account begins by considering how American 
corporate governance could plausibly have developed away from the 
Berle-Means model of powerful managers and passive shareholders. 
As capital demands intensified and firms grew in size, financial insti-
tutions and other intermediaries could have acquired large blocks of 
stock and played an active role in corporate governance. Some insti-
tutions did in fact take precisely these steps in the 1920s. DuPont 
held twenty-five percent of General Motors' stock, and J.P. Morgan 
and Company effectively controlled several railroads and other 
corporations. 22 
19. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 129. 
20. See id. 
21. See, e.g., RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC, 29 
J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]. 
22. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 15; see also RoN CHERNOW, THE HOUSE 
OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 224 (1990) 
(describing Morgan's role in restructuring General Motors). 
Economists have recently begun reconsidering this era, and addressing the effect large 
stockholders such as Morgan had on firm value. For evidence that Morgan had a beneficial 
effect, see Bradford DeLong, Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on 
Financial Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991). 
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Yet the United States did not follow this alternative path. 
Legislators repeatedly have taken steps to prevent financial 
intermediaries from holding significant equity positions in, and 
exerting influence over, industrial corporations. A variety of 
regulatory measures have limited the size of banks and their ability 
to hold stock. 23 Legislators have similarly discouraged insurance 
companies from holding stock, 24 and mutual funds from acquiring 
significant blocks in individual companies. 25 Pension funds face fewer 
restrictions of this sort, but they too have good reason to limit their 
influence. 26 Far more than economics alone, this mind-numbing web 
of regulation has assured the preeminence of the Berle-Means model 
of corporate governance in America. 27 
Why have legislators worked so hard to limit the influence of 
financial intermediaries? Mark Roe has identified three factors as 
particularly important. The first is ideological commitments such as 
populism. Although commentators often discount the relevance of 
ideology to political decision making, Americans have long been suspi-
23 . The fragmentation of banks goes back to the National Bank Act of 1863 and the 
National Bank Act of 1864, ch . 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38 
(1994)). See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 54. Congress has reinforced the limita-
tions on bank size and power in this century through the McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 
Stat. 1224 (1927), which gave states the authority to limit branching within the state; the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in title 12 of the United 
States Code), which separated commercial and investment banking; and the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S. C. §§ 1841-50), 
which limited bank holding companies to activities related to bankruptcy and prohibited them 
from holding more than five percent of the voting stock of a non-banking firm. See RoE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 94-99. In addition, the advent of deposit insurance in 1933 
enhanced small banks' ability to compete with larger banks for deposits. See id. at 96. 
24. The leading state for insurance law, New York, prohibited insurance companies from 
holding common stock after the Armstrong Investigation of 1905 created a scandal within the 
industry. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 69-70. New York eased these 
restrictions in 1951, but insurers have continued to limit their holdings of stock. See id. at 82. 
25 . Although mutual funds hold enormous amounts of common stock, they are discour-
aged from concentrating their holdings and acting as active monitors by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the tax laws, which penalize insufficiently diversified funds . See id. 
at 103-10. 
26. Private pension fund activism is stymied to some extent by the "prudent investor" 
doctrine under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), and still more 
by managers' control over the choice of a firm's fund manager. Public pension funds face fewer 
restrictions. See id. at 125-26. 
27. Several commentators have recently questioned the political account. Tom Smith, for 
instance, has argued that the desire of "customers" such as insurance policy holders and mutual 
fund investors to minimize risk, rather than politics, explains institutional investors' reluctance 
to become actively involved in corporate governance. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and 
Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1997). Smith's emphasis 
on risk aversion seems more compelling with respect to the customers of some kinds of institu-
t:ional investors-indexed mutual funds and insurance companies, for instance-than others, 
such as non-indexed mutual funds, which are designed to be less cautious. 
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cious of big business and large concentrations of capital. 28 Financial 
institutions have frequently borne the brunt of this distrust. Periodic 
investigations into financial institution misbehavior have stoked the 
concern that financial institutions be kept in check. Three of the most 
prominent were the Armstrong investigation of insurance companies 
in 1905, and the Pujo and Pecora investigations of banks in 1911-12 
and in the early 1930s, each of which fueled legislative reforms. 29 
The other two factors limiting the influence of financial 
intermediaries, interest group influence30 and federalism, have tended 
to reinforce one another, particularly in banking regulation. The most 
important proponents of banking restrictions were the small banks 
scattered throughout the country. 31 Small banks lobbied hard for the 
geographical restrictions that have long limited banks' ability to 
branch across state lines, since fragmentation prevents megabanks 
from putting local banks out of business. Small banks were equally 
enthusiastic about deposit insurance, which diminishes depositors' 
incentive to keep their money in large, stable money center banks.32 
By themselves small banks are only a single interest group, but 
federalism's decentralization of power has served to magnifY their 
influence, since each given state is likely to have a group of locally 
important banks. The broad-based influence of local banks-enhanced 
by the support of farmers and small businesses-stands in striking 
contrast to the geographical concentration of the money center banks 
that have been targeted by financial reform, and translates 
particularly well in our federal system.33 
28. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 32-36. 
29. See id. at 36-38. In addition to providing a crucial catalyst for change, the investiga-
tions put several well-known figures on the political map. Charles Evans Hughes catapulted to 
prominence as a result of the Armstrong investigations, and Ferdinand Pecora was an unknown 
before taking over the Pecora hearings early in Franklin Roosevelt's administration. 
30. Interest group theory is a branch of public choice analysis. For present purposes, its 
central insight is that concentrated interest groups tend to have disproportionate influence over 
the political process because they, unlike more diffuse groups such as general voters, participate 
actively in various ways. I have described interest group analysis and the public choice litera-
ture in much greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the 
Future of Public Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 V AND. L. REV. 64 7 (1997) [hereinafter 
Skeel, Public Choice] . 
31. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 45. 
32. See RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 96-97. Interestingly, Morgan and other 
prominent banks lent their support to deposit insurance, in large part because they thought this 
concession would help them head off the Glass-Steagall proposal to separate commercial and 
investment banking. The strategy backfired when both reforms were passed. 
33. See Roe, A Political Theory , supra note 21, at 49. The Senate, especially, facilitates 
the influence of federalism because every state, no matter how small, has the same number of 
senators. 
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In sum, populist ideology, the influence of small banks and 
farmers, and federalism have worked together to minimize the role of 
financial institutions in corporate governance. 34 Interestingly, man-
agers appear to have played little role in the fragmentation of finan-
cial intermediaries.35 
2. Relational Governance in Japan and Germany 
From politics and history, the political account turns to com-
parative corporate governance to further underscore the contingency 
of the Berle-Means model. Exhibits A and B in this part of the ac-
count are Japan and Germany, both of whose approaches to corporate 
governance look strikingly different from the road taken in American 
governance. 
In contrast to large U.S. corporations, whose shareholders 
have traditionally been dispersed and passive, their German and 
Japanese counterparts are characterized by concentrated sharehold-
ings, thin managerial labor markets and relational governance. 36 In 
Germany and Japan, banks play a particularly prominent role as 
shareholders, and non-financial firms also are much more likely to 
hold significant blocks of shares in other corporations than they do in 
the United States. 
In Germany, large corporations often have three or more bank 
shareholders, each of which holds roughly ten percent of the firm's 
stock.37 While this alone gives bank shareholders a substantial stake, 
they have even more leverage in practice. Not only do the banks serve 
as major lenders and underwriters for the firm, but German banks 
can also vote the stock they hold in a depository or trust capacity 
unless the beneficial owners of the stock affirmatively withdraw this 
authority. Banks often exercise their influence formally through 
representation on the firm's supervisory board and informally through 
their ability to step in whenever necessary. 3s 
34. This Article will use a similar typology in explaining the emergence of ex post corpo-
rate governance in this country and ex ante governance in Japan and Germany in Parts III and 
IV, infra, with one important difference. Rather than focusing on federalism alone, the Article 
considers the role that structural constraints in general have played in the evolutionary process. 
35. See Roe, A Political Theory , supra note 21, at 45-46. Roe speculates that managers 
would, however, actively oppose efforts to retreat from the reforms. See id. at 46. 
36. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 169-86; Mark J . Roe, Some Differences 
in Corporate Structures in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1936-48 
(1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences]. 
37. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 172. 
38. S ee id. at 172-77. 
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The details of Japanese corporate governance differ in impor-
tant respects, but reflect a similar concentration of shares in the 
hands of active shareholders. Prior to World War II, Japanese corpo-
rate governance featured a small group of zaibatsu-vast, intercon-
nected, family-run enterprises that included extensive cross holdings 
and the presence of a single financing bank.39 Since World War II and 
the dismantling of the zaibatsu by American occupation forces, the 
keiretsu have emerged as the principal organizational feature of 
Japanese corporate governance. 
The keiretsu are small groups of closely interconnected firms. 40 
Perhaps in part because the United States foisted much of its finan-
cial and securities regulation on Japan after World War II, including 
our limits on bank stock holdings, keiretsu firms generally have a 
small group of significant shareholders, rather than a single, domi-
nant shareholder. 41 These shareholders include one principal bank, 
the "main bank," which holds roughly five percent of the stock and 
also serves as the primary lender, together with four or five other 
large stockholders, each of which holds a similarly large block of 
stock. Collectively, these shareholders hold twenty to twenty-five 
percent of the firm's stock and a seat at the periodic Presidents' 
Council meetings where managers meet informally with the firm's 
important shareholders. 42 
The effect of concentrated shareholding in Germany and Japan 
is to encourage relational governance, rather than the atomized, mar-
ket-driven governance one sees with U.S. firms. The large 
shareholders tend to hold their shares on a long-term basis and often 
act as lenders or suppliers to the German or Japanese firms. 43 
39. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1963; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. 
Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and 
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 882-83 (1993) [hereinafter Gilson & Roe, Overlaps] . 
Although the zaibatsu are often described as dominating Japanese corporate governance prior to 
World War II, Okazaki offers evidence that many large Japanese firms were not part of a 
zaibatsu. Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE 
JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 350, 351-52 (Masahiko Aoki & 
Ronald Dare eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE JAPANESE FIRM] (only 10 of 60 largest mining and 
manufacturing firms were zaibatsu-related). 
40. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1939. 
41. The emergence of powerful institutional shareholders in Japan, despite its adoption of 
many of the reforms that produced fragmentation in the United States, is powerful evidence of a 
theme that runs throughout the Article-that laws by themselves can be a misleading indicator 
of a nation's corporate governance or corporate bankruptcy. 
42. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1939-48. Whether the Presidents' Council 
meetings play a meaningful role in Japanese governance is debatable, but the large 
shareholders themselves clearly do. 
43 . This is particularly true in Japan. For a description and an argument that cross-hold-
ings help to discourage "stable" shareholders from opportunistically selling their shares, see 
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Proponents of the political account point out that these relationships 
may facilitate a valuable long-term perspective and the exchange of 
confidential information between a firm and its shareholders. The 
presence of friendly shareholders appears to chill market correctives 
such as hostile takeovers, and the shareholders are well positioned to 
intervene and to remove managers or take other steps in the event of 
a crisis. 44 
In short, German and Japanese corporate governance provide 
a vivid counterpoint to the Berle-Means corporation in the United 
States. The pattern in both countries of active shareholders with 
substantial stakes strongly reinforces the argument that the 
American model of fragmented shareholding reflects more than 
economic necessity alone. 
B. Completing the Governance Puzzle: The Role of 
Corporate Bankruptcy 
The political account has prompted a wide-ranging reconsid-
eration of our assumptions about the Berle-Means corporation. Yet 
nearly all of the existing analysis omits a crucial piece from the corpo-
rate governance analysis: bankruptcy. This Part introduces that 
piece and develops an evolutionary theory of the dynamic between 
corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy. The Article will 
continue to focus on the United States, Japan, and Germany, but the 
theory should apply to corporate governance in any developed nation. 
The governance framework of the United States, with rela-
tively dispersed shareholdings and active securities markets, relies in 
important part on hostile takeovers to address managerial agency 
costs. 45 Poorly run firms may be subject to a takeover and the threat 
of takeovers has an important deterrent effect. But hostile takeovers 
are a blunt instrument and frequently they misfire. A firm that must 
Paul Sheard, Interlocking Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in THE JAPANESE FIRM, 
supra note 39, at 310, 325-33. 
44. See RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 169-86; Roe, Some Differences, supra 
note 36, at 1936-48. For a criticism of the view that relational shareholding emerged in Japan 
at least in part as a conscious effort by managers to chill takeover activity, see J. Mark 
Ramseyer, Colombian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005, 2009 
(1993). 
45. A prescient article by Henry Manne anticipated the role that takeovers would play in 
subsequent corporate governance. Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965). The most prominent recent commentators on the role of 
takeovers in addressing managerial agency costs are Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. 
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAw 109-44 (1991). 
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shoulder an enormous new debt load, as many takeover targets did in 
the 1980s, may face immediate disaster in the event of an unexpected 
shock.46 Moreover, firms that are not taken over but whose managers 
issue substantial new debt in order to discourage actual or potential 
bidders face precisely the same risk. 47 
To the extent a firm's failure reflects problems with its capital 
structure rather than with the business itself, destruction of its going-
concern value would entail a significant social cost.48 In view of this, 
one might suspect-and one certainly would hope-that a governance 
system relying on active markets and the uncertain corrective of 
takeovers, would also include a mechanism for keeping existing man-
agement in place and preserving going-concern value when an other-
wise healthy corporation fails. 
In theory, liquidation-oriented bankruptcy could serve this 
function. 49 Several bankruptcy commentators have in fact defended 
such an approach, arguing that financially distressed businesses 
should be sold at auction. 50 However, there are a variety of reasons 
why liquidation might prove ineffective as a means of preserving 
going-concern value. If a firm's failure comes during a general indus-
46. One reason for the precariousness of takeovers is that state anti-takeover laws and 
takeover defenses make hostile bids much more expensive than they might otherwise be. For a 
discussion of these factors and a survey of the empirical evidence on takeover profits, see 
Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 
119 (1992). 
47. Although increasing a firm's debt load increases the risk of bankruptcy, it may also 
have desirable effects. As Michael Jensen has pointed out, for instance, debt constrains manag-
ers' discretion by reducing free cash flow and can, in consequence, substantially reduce mana-
gerial agency costs. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
48. One can perhaps imagine firms designing their capital structure in such a way that 
failure is likely to reflect non-viability. For an argument along these lines, see Barry E. Adler, 
A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (1997). However, the text assumes 
that capital structure and viability may not be correlated, as is the case under existing 
American law. See id. at 344. 
49. It might also appear that private renegotiation could preserve going-concern value in 
the absence of state-sponsored reorganization. But collective action problems would impede 
renegotiation, and in the United States existing legal restrictions would impose further 
obstacles. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 232 
(1987) (effect of prohibition against binding bondholders by majority vote). 
50. Douglas Baird was the first to suggest auctions as an alternative to corporate reor-
ganization. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127 (1986). He later considered the benefits and limitations of such an approach in 
thoughtful detail. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 
(1993). Several other proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 rely on more elaborate auction 
procedures. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 523 (1992) (options-based auction); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (same). For a review and critique of these and 
other proposals, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of 
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465 [hereinafter Skeel, Brave New World]. 
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try downturn, for instance, the firm's competitors, who often .are the 
most likely bidders, may not be able to participate in the bidding. 51 
More importantly, the prospect of liquidation would influence 
managerial behavior in ways that would transform the corporate law 
side of U.S. corporate governance.52 If managers expected to lose their 
jobs in the event of bankruptcy, they would face the combined threat 
of hostile takeovers, on the one hand, and on the other, displacement 
in bankruptcy if the firm failed after the managers took steps such as 
issuing new debt in order to protect themselves against the takeover 
threat. Rather than simply accept this lose-lose regime, managers 
would have an incentive to reduce the firm's debt and to seek out 
large, stable shareholders that would implicitly promise not to tender 
into any outside tender offer. 53 Alternatively, an increase of the 
number of firms that failed following hostile takeovers would lead to 
pressure by their managers for a more flexible bankruptcy regime. 54 
Either way, if we consider both the background regime and managers' 
likely responses to it, it quickly becomes clear that liquidation-based 
bankruptcy is unlikely to coexist with active markets and hostile 
takeovers. · 
Although U.S. bankruptcy law includes a liquidation option, it 
looks to another mechanism for preserving going-concern value: 
corporate reorganization. In a corporate reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,55 a firm's constituencies engage 
in an often extended negotiation process, whose goal is to confirm a 
reorganization plan that will address the financial difficulties that 
landed the firm in bankruptcy. 
51. See Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 50, at 477-79 (citing Andrei Shliefer & Robert 
W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 
1343 (1992)). There may also be other reasons for preferring reorganization to an auction, such 
as the benefits to competition of preserving the troubled firm as an intact entity. 
52. For an analysis of the likely effects of the liquidation-based bankruptcy reforms on 
pre-bankruptcy behavior, see Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform 
on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994). 
53. If managers persuaded the legislature to eliminate hostile takeovers the ultimate 
effect would be similar. Under these circumstances, investors would have an incentive to 
acquire concentrated stakes, as discussed in more detail in Part II.C., infra. 
54. Notice that a move to flexible bankruptcy may in fact be in shareholders' (not just 
managers') interests in a world with active takeover markets and fragmented ownership. The 
benefit of manager-led reorganization is that it helps to coordinate scattered shareholders in the 
event of financial distress. For a similar point about managers' role in response to takeover 
bids, see, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 502 (1991) (criticizing Easterbrook and Fischel's 
proposal to prevent managers from resisting takeover bids as "depriv[ing] shareholders of a 
negotiator at precisely the time when they need one most"). 
55. Provisions of the current Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994), will be cited 
hereafter as "Bankruptcy Code § _." 
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Notice again the importance of managers' perspectives. If 
managers were inevitably displaced in the event of bankruptcy, they 
would treat the framework like a liquidation regime, even if it theo-
retically included a reorganization option, since for them bankruptcy 
would be the end of the road. It is therefore crucial to the U.S. 
approach that managers retain at least some control over the bank-
ruptcy process.56 
To underscore the importance of managers' perspectives, this 
Article characterizes each nation's corporate bankruptcy regime as 
either "manager-driven" or "manager-displacing." The U.S. approach 
typifies manager-driven corporate bankruptcy. In "manager 
displacement" regimes, by contrast, managers lose their jobs if the 
firms file for bankruptcy, and bankruptcy generally entails piecemeal 
liquidation (even if the bankruptcy laws ostensibly include a reor-
ganization option).57 
The characteristics of U.S. corporate governance-active 
markets, relatively passive, often scattered shareholders, and a well-
developed managerial labor market, combined with manager-driven 
reorganization in bankruptcy-not only developed together, but also 
comprise the complementary facets of a single system. A permanent 
change in corporate governance would require a different approach to 
corporate bankruptcy, and vice versa. Alternative arrangements 
would be inherently unstable. 
Throughout the Article, I will refer to the kind of approach we 
see in the United States as an ex post governance system. The system 
has an ex post perspective in at least two respects. First, on the cor-
porate governance side, hostile takeovers can be seen as an ex post 
mechanism for reducing managerial agency costs, since takeover 
bidders emerge after managers have failed to run the firm effi-
56. In particular, Chapter 11 assumes that a firm's managers will continue to run the 
firm, Bankruptcy Code §§ 1101, 1107 (assuming continued operation by the "debtor-in-posses-
sion"), and it gives the debtor-in-possession the first crack at proposing a reorganization plan, 
Bankruptcy Code § 1121 (120-day exclusivity period during which only the debtor-in-possession 
may propose plan). 
To be sure, managers hardly have free reign in Chapter 11. Recent studies suggest they 
frequently are replaced before the conclusion of the reorganization. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson, 
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J . FIN. ECON. 355, 356 (1990) (most current 
managers removed before end of Chapter 11 case). But some do retain their jobs, and Chapter 
11 is much more attractive to them than the certain displacement of a liquidation regime. 
57. As the text suggests, an important reason for focusing on managers, rather than the 
distinction between reorganization-based (like the United States) and liquidation-based ap-
proaches (like Germany), is that it isolates the single variable that determines how bankruptcy 
functions in practice (as opposed to the law "on the books"). For instance, although Japan's 
bankruptcy laws include a reorganization option, they also provide for immediate removal of a 
firm's managers and invariably lead to liquidation. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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ciently.58 On the bankruptcy side, Chapter 11 assures that the man-
agers of a firm that encounters financial distress can attempt to 
reorganize after the fact. 59 
Given the striking differences between U.S. and Japanese or 
German corporate governance, one also would expect Japanese and 
German bankruptcy to differ from the American approach. And they 
do. In both Japan and Germany, the managers of a firm that files for 
bankruptcy lose their jobs immediately. Although Japanese law 
purports to provide a bankruptcy reorganization option, there is an 
extraordinarily strong bias toward liquidation. 5° 
Japan and Germany can thus be seen as having adopted an ex 
ante approach to corporate governance. In contrast to American 
firms, which rely on ex post devices such as takeovers to address 
managerial agency costs, Japanese and German corporations look to 
existing, long-term shareholders to monitor managerial perform-
ance-that is, to "relational" governance. 61 On the bankruptcy side, 
Japanese and German managers are held to their ex ante contractual 
obligations. If a corporation fails, its managers cannot count on a 
second chance; quite to the contrary, they face immediate displace-
ment.62 
58. This does not suggest that hostile takeovers have only an ex post effect. To the con-
trary, much of their effectiveness stems from their deterrent effect-i.e., the incentive they give 
managers to run firms efficiently so that the firm will not be taken over. See EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 173. I characterize takeovers as ex post because the takeover 
mechanism itself operates after the fact. 
59. One could also conceptualize the approach in temporal terms. On this view, investors 
can intervene to correct poor management at various stages, starting with shareholder voting, 
then moving to debtholders' invocation of default rights, hostile takeovers, and as a final resort, 
bankruptcy. See George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in 
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 101, 
105 (1996). As this time line suggests, investors in an ex post regime tend to intervene rela-
tively late, rather than correcting problems early. 
60. Japanese corporate bankruptcy law is derived from the Chandler Act amendments to 
the former Bankruptcy Act. See infra notes 218, 221 and accompanying text. The Japanese 
framework includes an explicit reorganization option but it burdens that option by displacing 
the managers of a distressed firm with a trustee. As in Germany, the vast majority of firms are 
liquidated if they file for bankruptcy. 
German bankruptcy law provides for straight liquidation and a limited composition option, 
which permits composition if creditors are likely to recover at least 35 percent of their claims. 
Even in a composition, however, the principal goal is to liquidate the firm. Germany has 
adopted a more substantial reorganization option to take effect in 1999, but· the presumptive 
displacement of managers and bias towards liquidation are retained. For further discussion, see 
infra Part IV. 
61. See generally Curtis J . Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate 
Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 3 (1996) (analyzing the 
Japanese System). 
62. In temporal terms, the relational shareholders tend to intervene earlier, prior to bank-
ruptcy, in an ex ante governance regime. See supra note 59. 
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As with ex post governance, the corporate law and bankruptcy 
components of ex ante governance are integrally and necessarily con-
nected. Consider first the perspective of a bank that acts as a rela-
tional monitor. In order to serve as an effective monitor, the bank 
must have enough leverage over the debtor to implement change if 
the firm's managers misbehave or the firm performs poorly. Only if it 
can displace managers in an emergency, and force a restructuring of 
the firm, will the bank prove effective as a monitor. 63 
The bank acquires this leverage in several ways. The first is 
through simple voting power. The bank is likely to be a significant 
shareholder, particularly if it joins forces with other holders of large 
blocks of stock.64 Second, in addition to its shareholdings, the bank 
often serves as a principal source of financing. If managers resist a 
restructuring, the bank can threaten to cut off the firm's financing. 
Managers have good reason to respond to this threat because 
Japanese and German firms have fewer alternative sources of financ-
ing than do their United States counterparts, 65 and because the with-
drawal of a relational bank-which knows more about the firm than 
any other party-would send a powerfully negative signal to other 
potential lenders. 
While voting power and control over financing play a signifi-
cant role in influencing managers' behavior, only by adding bank-
ruptcy to the mix can we appreciate the full extent of the relational 
monitor's leverage. Managers face dire consequences (i.e. immediate 
removal) if they resist any changes proposed by the relational monitor 
and the firm subsequently winds up in bankruptcy. As a result, man-
63. For a discussion of banks' monitoring role in Japan, see Gilson & Roe, Overlaps, supra 
note 39, at 879-82. The Japanese government sometimes figures prominently in corporate 
restructurings in Japan, usually to urge the main bank to bail out a troubled firm. For a dis-
cussion of some of the perverse incentives this creates for main banks, see Masahiko Aoki, The 
Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE 
FIRM, supra note 39, at 11, 32. 
64. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1943-46 (suggesting relational monitors 
in Japan and Germany act through coalitions and that no single shareholder has sufficient 
power to act as a controlling influence). 
65. This is less true now than it was in the past, as secondary markets have expanded in 
both countries, but Japanese and German firms are still much more dependant on bank financ-
ing than American firms. Interestingly, as securities markets have expanded in Japan, com-
mercial banks have tried to maintain their dominance by expanding their involvement in 
securities underwriting. See Jathon Sapsford, New Rules Roil Japan Bond Underwriting, WALL 
ST. J ., June 11, 1997, at A18 (banks taking advantage of 1993 rule change enabling them to 
engage in underwriting). 
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ager-displacing bankruptcy powerfully reinforces the credibility of a 
relational monitor's threat to take action in an ex ante system.66 
The costs to managers of responding to powerful bank share-
holders are justified by important benefits. Although the presence of 
large shareholders can be intrusive, the shareholders' long-term 
commitment to the firm makes it nearly impossible for an outsider to 
acquire sufficient stock to effect a hostile takeover. 67 Moreover, the 
cataclysmic effect of failure enhances the attractiveness of relational 
monitors whose long-term stake in the firm will encourage them to 
stick with the firm in the event of a temporary downturn in fortunes. 
From a less benign perspective, managers may also be able to neutral-
ize large shareholders to some extent through implicit side payments 
such as future business at supracompetitive rates. 68 
Because harsh, manager-displacing bankruptcy cements the 
relational governance arrangements in an ex ante system, a shift to 
manager-driven bankruptcy would have a serious destabilizing effect. 
If managers could file for bankruptcy without fear of immediately 
losing their jobs and with a real possibility of reorganizing, the rela-
tional bank's threat of displacement would lose much of its bite. An 
unforgiving bankruptcy regime is thus crucial-not just useful-to ex 
ante governance. 
To complete the picture, one more player must be added to our 
account of ex ante governance: the state. In Japan in particular, the 
government plays an active role in corporate governance. In addition 
to an ongoing process referred to as Administrative Guidance, the 
state sometimes pressures relational monitors to preserve a troubled 
66. In the corporate finance field, Robert Hauswald makes a somewhat similar point, and 
develops a theory of the relationship between banking and bankruptcy laws that parallels my 
analysis in some respects . See Robert B.H. Hauswald, Banking Systems, Bankruptcy 
Arrangements and Institutional Complementarity (March 27, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) [hereinafter Banking Systems]; Robert B.H. Hauswald, Financial 
Contracting, Reorganization and Mixed Finance: A Theory of Banking Systems (March 7, 1996) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Financial Contracting]. In contrast 
to my approach in this Article, he focuses narrowly on the role of limited and universal banking. 
This, together with his focus on legal rules rather than how governance functions in practice, 
leads to substantial differences in the analyses. Thus, Hauswald reaches the unlikely 
conclusion that Japanese governance parallels American rather than German governance. See 
also F.H. Buckley, The Canadian Keiretsu, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 46, 52 (1997) (absence of 
stay of enforcement rights crucial to banks' influence in Canada). 
67. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 171 ("managers [in Japan and Germany] 
prefer institutional white squires, who shield managers from outside pressures, to takeovers"); 
Sheard, supra note 43, at 319 (role of interlocking shareholdings in chilling takeovers). 
68. For a similar concern about concentrated shareholding in Canadian firms, see Ronald 
J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime, 29 
0SGOODE HALL L.J. 863, 884-88 (1991). 
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labor markets, 76 and manager-displacing bankruptcy substitutes for a 
manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy process. 77 
Consider in slightly more detail what would happen if one part 
of the governance regime were altered. As discussed earlier,78 in a 
regime that mixed ex post governance with manager-displacing (ex 
ante) bankruptcy, managers would have an incentive to seek out 
relational investors both to neutralize the threat of a hostile takeover, 
and to reduce the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing in the event of 
financial distress. 79 
To complete the analysis, consider the perspective of investors. 
In a regime with scattered shareholdings, liquid markets, and man-
ager-displacing bankruptcy, substantial gains are available to an in-
vestor who acquires a concentrated stake. Such an investor is par-
ticularly well positioned to monitor the firm, since managers' concems 
about hostile takeovers and the threat of displacement in the event of 
bankruptcy will afford significant leverage over managerial decision 
making. Gains that stem from enhanced monitoring would often be 
socially beneficial, but there is a less benign side as well. A concen-
trated investor may also enjoy special treatment from managers who 
are eager to buy the investor's peace-managers may direct business 
to the investor, for instance, or offer other private benefits.80 
Whatever the mix of benefits, the overall effect would be to move 
corporate governance in an ex ante direction. 
76. An interesting illustration of the substitutionary relationship can be found in commen-
tators' characterization of relational governance-in particular, relational shareholders' ability 
to effect change-as "internalizing" the takeover market. See, e.g. , Sheard, supra note 43, at 
318-20. 
77. Because voting authority is important to both ex ante and ex post governance, proxy 
contests play an intriguing intermediate role in the two systems. The threat of a proxy contest 
is an important component of ex ante governance, as this reinforces the relational monitors' 
leverage over the debtor. But the availability of the device tends to make its use unnecessary. 
In an ex post system, by contrast, proxy contests are an important adjunct to the takeover 
process. In the 1950s, most American takeovers were effected through proxy contests, and 
proxy contests have become more prevalent in recent years due to the obstacles to direct 
takeovers. 
78. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
79. As also discussed earlier, an alternative possibility is that the managers of distressed 
firms might try to retain control in bankruptcy and to effect a reorganization-that is, to shift 
the regime back in an ex post direction. If this proved successful over time, the nation's corpo-
rate law would also tend to retain an ex post character. For an argument that something like 
this occurred in American corporate law and bankruptcy in the 1950s, see infra Part III.E. The 
point, once again, is that the relationship between corporate law and bankruptcy is dynamic, 
and that the two will evolve in tandem. 
80. Ed Rock has characterized this as a "dark side" of the recent enthusiasm for relational 
governance in the United States. Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational 
Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994); see also Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 68, at 896 
(describing Canadian corporate governance). 
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The analysis thus far has shown that the combination of ex 
post corporate law and ex ante bankruptcy would prove unstable . The 
opposite combination--ex ante corporate law and ex post bank-
ruptcy-is implausible for very similar reasons. Without manager-
displacing bankruptcy, relational governance would lose much of its 
effectiveness. Unless creditors took control of the bankruptcy process 
(thus shifting it in an ex ante, manager-displacing direction), stock 
ownership would fragment; we would then expect to see market 
correctives such as takeovers or, in their absence, proxy contests 
replace relational monitoring as the principal mechanism for 
disciplining managers. 81 
The evolutionary theory developed in this Article does not 
depend on any particular claims about the direction as causality. It 
seems likely that changes in corporate governance will more 
frequently prompt changes in bankruptcy, rather than the reverse, 
given that the percentage of publicly held firms that fail at any 
particular time is relatively low. But the important point is that a 
shift in one attribute will inevitably lead to a shift in the other, as 
managers and investors adjust to the change. 
The theoretical analysis raises a host of questions. First, why 
has the United States gravitated toward ex post governance, whereas 
Japanese and German corporate law is characterized by ex ante 
governance? Second, is one approach more efficient than the other? 
Third, how stable is the approach in any given country? That is, will 
the patterns that we see under existing law endure, or can we expect 
to see significant changes, such as a convergence on ex ante 
governance, ex post governance, or some middle ground? 
The next two Parts address the first question, how it is that 
corporate governance evolves within a given nation, with particular 
emphasis on the evolution of ex post governance in the United States. 
These Parts show both the institutional nature of the evolutionary 
process and the extent to which changes in corporate governance have 
paralleled changes in corporate bankruptcy. Having considered the 
issue of "why" there is ex post governance in this country, and ex ante 
81. American corporate governance in recent years seems at first glance to be an excep-
tion to this analysis. In the 1980s, managers successfully lobbied the legislatures of many 
states for anti-takeover protection, thus shifting American corporate governance in an ex ante 
direction. This does not mean that American corporate law is now ex ante in nature, however. 
Anti-takeover statutes and other developments have burdened the market for corporate control, 
but takeovers have not disappeared. Bidders have increased their use of other pressures, such 
as proxy contests, to effect change. Though not as market-driven as it might be, American 
corporate law, like American bankruptcy, has remained decidedly ex post in character. 
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governance in Japan and Germany, we can then compare the 
efficiency and stability of the two systems in Part V. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW AND 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 
Part II contended that corporate bankruptcy is the crucial 
missing piece in understanding corporate governance. Having 
explored this argument in general terms, we shift now to a more 
nuanced, historical perspective, beginning in this Part with the 
emergence of ex post governance in the United States. The analysis 
will once again place particular emphasis on bankruptcy, both 
because of its importance to the overall story and because much of 
this story has not previously been told. But it is important to keep in 
mind that the overall focus is on both corporate governance and 
corporate bankruptcy. To make this explicit, I will regularly relate 
the analysis to historical developments on the corporate law side. 
The account that follows is one of adaptive evolution.82 
Although the focus of this part is descriptive rather than normative, 
the analysis will be colored by my view that competitive pressures 
impel the evolutionary process in developed nations in a generally 
efficient direction. 83 Although political and historical events can 
influence development, sometimes in dramatic ways, the resulting 
system is unlikely to prove markedly inefficient over time.84 
Periodic price shocks have served as the principal catalyst for 
change, prompting nearly all of the historical developments in our 
82. The most prominent exponent of this institutional approach to economic history is 
Douglass North. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1991); see also Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive 
Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems, in INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ARNE RYDE SYMPOSIUM, FROSTAVALLEN 26-27 (Stefan Hedlund ed., 
1985) (developing theory of adaptive evolution of institutions). 
83 . This will be particularly apparent when the Article compares the efficiency of ex ante 
and ex post governance in Part V.B. 
84. Because manager-driven corporate reorganization emerged in the United States in the 
common law, the analysis that follows has important implications for the debate as to the 
efficiency of the common law. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the 
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law 
Efficient?, 6 J . LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For a discussion of the debate spawned by these articles, 
see Skeel, Public Choice, supra note 30, at 662-63. 
Interest group distortions-€specially the influence of lawyers-eall into question any strong 
claims about the efficiency of the common law. Yet market competit ion acts as a powerful 
counteractive to any egregious inefficiencies in the bankruptcy framework. See infra Part 
V.A.l. 
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corporate bankruptcy framework. 85 To appreciate how the existing 
framework emerged and the uniquely American flavor of the process, 
it is useful to focus on three different factors: (1) interest group 
influence; (2) structural constraints; and (3) ideology. I use these fac-
tors to explain five critical phases in the development of manager-
driven corporate reorganization. The story begins with the emergence 
of equity receiverships to reorganize railroads in the nineteenth 
century. It continues with the uncertainty in the 1920s as to whether 
the managers of non-railroad corporations could use the receivership 
device to reorganize. Next are the sweeping changes ushered in by 
the New Deal, and the decline of the role of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in corporate bankruptcy beginning in the 
1950s. This Part concludes with a brief discussion of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code and subsequent trends. 
At each stage of the analysis, I also note the prevailing 
characteristics of corporate governance. The correlation between 
changes in corporate governance and in corporate bankruptcy is not 
immediate, but the historical analysis strongly confirms the link 
between the two. 
A. The Storyline: Three Central Factors 
The methodology of public choice figures permanently in the 
analysis. Public choice analysis assumes that legislators and other 
institutional players, such as judges, tend to act in their own self-
interest; and that largely because of this, interest groups play a 
particularly influential role in legislative and judicial developments, 
just as they do in the marketplace. 86 Yet interest group analysis by 
itself can only begin to explain how the current framework arose. 87 To 
provide a more complete account I also consider the crucial role that 
structural constraints and ideology have played in directing the 
evolution of American corporate bankruptcy. 
85. North argues that dramatic shifts can occur in the wake of significant price changes 
because price changes give the relevant parties an incentive to renegotiate the rules of interac-
tion. Yet the tenacity of existing norms may prevent change even if the formal rules change. 
See NORTH, supra note 82, at 86-91. In the analysis that follows in this Part and the next, we 
will see evidence of both elements-dramatic change and the tenacity of underlying norms. 
86. For a detailed discussion of the public choice literature and its two principal strands of 
interest group theory and social choice, see Skeel, Public Choice, supra note 30. In the political 
sphere, interest group influence stems from the fact that interest groups tend to participate 
much more actively in the legislative process-contributing to campaigns and voting, for in-
stance-than does the diffuse general group of voters. See id. at 651-52. 
87. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 22-32 (emphasizing role of populism and 
other factors in legislation affecting corporate governance). 
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1. Interest Groups 
From an interest group perspective, players are in many 
respects the same as in the political account of corporate law, though 
with several important differences . The analysis will pay particular 
attention to the role of managers (both their presence and, at times, 
their surprising absence), Wall Street banks, and New Deal 
reformers. Much more than in corporate law, lawyers88 also left their 
mark in important ways. 
2. Structural Constraints 
Most of the principal structural constraints we will see on 
corporate law can be traced to the federalism enshrined in the United 
States Constitution. In contrast to most other nations, the United 
States is divided into numerous individual states that traditionally 
have wielded substantial political power. States' influence comes both 
from explicit constitutional directives and the power they derive from 
the federalist system as a whole.89 In addition to federalism, the re-
spective roles of Congress and the courts figure prominently in the 
evolutionary story. 
3. Ideology 
The final factor is ideology, which the Article will construe 
broadly to mean any widely held view about the appropriate treat-
ment of publicly held corporations. Perhaps the most enduring ideo-
logical commitment in this country is an aversion to the concentration 
of capital in large banks and corporations. In corporate law, this 
aversion helps to explain the fragmentation of banks and the much 
smaller role they play in the United States, as compared to Japan and 
Germany.90 It also influences debates about bankruptcy-sometimes 
in counterintuitive ways. Although manager-driven reorganization 
seems to cater to big business and may therefore provoke a skeptical 
88. The focus throughout the early part of the story will be on the elite Wall Street reor-
ganization bar, which developed and perfected the equity receivership procedure. Although the 
general bankruptcy bar-lawyers involved in the bankruptcy cases of individuals and small 
businesses-does not figure in the initial development of corporate reorganization, its influence 
does have an important-albeit partially accidental-€ffect on the Chandler Act of 1938 and 
subsequent developments. See infra Part III.E. 
89 . As noted earlier, I refer to structural constraints rather than simply federalism 
because other, often related factors-such as the nature and capacity of the judicial 
system-also come into play. See supra note 34. 
90. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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response, for instance, it also diminishes the influence that banks and 
other large stakeholders might have in a harsher, manager-displace-
ment regime. 
Two other ideological themes also recur: first, the American 
fascination with second chances and reversals of fortune; 91 and sec-
ond, the view that certain firms cannot be permitted to fail, even if 
Congress itself cannot realistically take action.92 
One must, of course, be cautious about attaching causal sig-
nificance to ideology, since it almost by definition reflects the nature 
of prevailing institutional conditions. Yet ideological currents do shift 
in ways that are useful to understanding the emergence of the 
American corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy framework. 
Using these tools, let us consider the remarkable story of how 
ex post governance emerged in the United States. 
B. Equity Receiverships and Railroad Reorganization 
If the early history of flexible, reorganization-based corporate 
bankruptcy could be distillec1 to a single word, that word would be 
"railroads."93 As difficult as it is to imagine today, the existence of 
manager-driven reorganization was not at all inevitable. Well into 
the nineteenth century, financial distress meant displacement of the 
firm's managers and piecemeal liquidation, much as it does in Japan 
and Germany today. 94 
To understand why this changed, and the peculiar institu-
tional pressures that produced our current bankruptcy system, we 
must briefly consider the explosive growth and rocky history of rail-
roads in the nineteenth century. In both the 1870s and the 1890s, the 
railroads were crippled by financial crises brought on by over-
expansion and a shaky national economy. 95 One after another the 
railroads failed, raising the question: what should be done? 
91. This theme pervades much of the popular mythology about America and its history, 
from the Horatio Alger stories to Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis." See, e.g., 
FREDERICK J. TuRNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY ( 1920). 
92. Recent beneficiaries of this are Chrysler, which the government helped to keep out of 
bankruptcy, and in banking, Continental Illinois. 
93. This in a sense is no surprise, since the railroads were the nation's first true publicly 
held corporations. The changes in technology that produced the railroads and later, the other 
great trusts, initiated the era of large-scale business in America. The classic account of the 
influence of technology on the emergence of publicly held corporations is ALFRED D. CHANDLER, 
JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
94. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 745-46 (1991). 
95 . See Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional 
Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 688 (1974). 
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The role of ideology in answering this question was simple and 
quite clear. Almost everyone agreed that the railroads could not be 
permitted to fail. Unlike most other corporations, railroads served a 
crucial public function that was essential to the nation's growth. 
Interestingly, vestiges of this sentiment can still be found in the 
Bankruptcy Code's special railroad provisions, which forbid liquida-
tion and require judges to take the "public interest" into account.96 
The governments of most other countries, Japan and Germany 
included, might well have responded by intervening directly or 
indirectly to rescue the railroads. In this country, by contrast, 
Congress never intervened. The parties were left to their own devices 
due to structural constraints that loomed particularly large in the 
nineteenth century. 
The Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to establish 
the nation's bankruptcy laws.97 If there had been a bankruptcy law on 
the books at the end of the 1870s or in the early 1890s, the law itself 
could have provided for railroad reorganization, as the current Code 
does.98 The absence of a bankruptcy law was the result of 
impassioned debate on both whether there was a need for federal 
bankruptcy and how extensive Congress's bankruptcy powers actually 
were. 99 Powerful advocates of states' rights, ranging from Thomas 
Jefferson early in the century to John Calhoun later on, argued for 
very limited powers. Most importantly for present purposes, the 
debates raised serious doubts as to whether Congress could regulate 
the bankruptcy of corporations, given that the states regulated all 
other aspects of a corporation's existence. 100 
Congress could have intervened in other ways but similar 
constraints rendered this unlikely. Although railroads are a classic 
example of interstate commerce, Congress's Commerce Clause powers 
were construed extremely narrowly for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Even if it could have intervened in multi-state railroads, 
96. Bankruptcy Code § 1165; see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 219 
(1997). 
97 . U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 4 states that "Congress shall have the Power ... [t)o 
establish . .. uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 
98 . See generally Martin, supra note 95, at 688 (emphasizing the absence of any federal 
bankruptcy law between 1878 and 1896, and railroad bondholders' foreclosure rights as impor-
tant factors in the emergence of equity receivership). 
99. For a discussion of the nineteenth century debates as to the scope of the Bankruptcy 
Clause and its applicability to corporations, see Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 476-89. 
100. See id. at 480-82. Thus, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky argued forcefully that 
" 'Corporations are artificial beings, created by the States ... . [The States] know when it is best 
to make or abolish them.'" Id. at 481 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., at 848 
(1840)) . 
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Congress's authority over single state railroads was questionable. 101 
More importantly in practical terms, the states were sufficiently 
powerful-particularly in the Senate-to tie Congress's hands. 1o2 
Congress's inability to act did not mean that state legislatures 
could fill the void. Because many railroads operated in more than one 
state, and states had very little ability to influence out-of-state activi-
ties, state legislatures proved similarly impotent. 103 
This then was the dilemma: a deep ideological consensus sug-
gested that railroads should not be permitted to fail, but structural 
constraints stymied the most obvious solution. The fact that struc-
tural constraints precluded a legislative solution is particularly note-
worthy given that so many of the principal interest groups-not just 
the managers of railroads, but shareholders, creditors, investment 
bankers, and railroad lawyers-were squarely in favor of reorganizing 
rather than liquidating the railroads.104 
A key factor in the parties' convergence of interests was the 
chaotic capital structure of the railroads. Railroads frequently fi-
nanced expansion by selling secured bonds to the public (often to 
foreign rather than American investors). 105 Rather than granting 
blanket security interests, as a firm might do today, the railroads 
offered discrete sections of track or other assets as collateral. 
101. As late as the New Deal bankruptcy reforms of the 1930s, some lawmakers continued 
to raise questions as to whether Congress could invoke its commerce powers to regulate single 
state railroads. As a result, the railroad reorganization provision, section 77, as initially en-
acted was limited to railroads that engaged in interstate commerce. 
102. Until 1913, senators were elected by state legislatures, which gave states enormous 
influence in the Senate. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests : A Public 
Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994). 
103. States' inability to affect out-of-state interests was one of the arguments for federaliz-
ing corporate bankruptcy in the nineteenth century. See Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 
547 & n.327; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 368 (1827) ("discharge under 
a state law [is] incompetent to discharge a debt due a citizen of another state"). 
104. Some interest groups might prefer that a particular railroad be allowed to 
fail-healthy, competing railroads, for instance, or firms engaged in competing modes of trans-
portation such as shipping (and in this century, trucking). It is possible that these interests 
lobbied against legislative intervention, though I have seen no evidence of this in my research. 
The possibility that such groups might have reinforced the resistance to federal legislation 
points to an important advantage of a judicial solution such as the one that emerged-only the 
parties directly interested in the fate of a particular railroad would have standing to support or 
oppose the receivership process. Receivership is therefore an example of a context where the 
choice of institutions (in this case, the courts rather than Congress) significantly affects the 
interest group dynamic. For a discussion of institutional choice, see generally NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
105. By the early part of this century, European investors held roughly one-third of the 
bonded debt of American railroads . S ee F.H. Buckley, The American Stay , 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J . 733 , 743 (1994) (citing WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 8 
(1927)) . 
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Consequently, one issuance might be secured by a segment of track in 
one part of the state, another by track in a different part. What re-
sulted was a crazy quilt of security interests, made even more 
Byzantine by waves of mergers among the railroads. 106 
The problems from the bondholders' perspective were that it 
would be nearly impossible to unravel the respective priorities of the 
bond issues, and that the value of their collateral-say, one hundred 
miles of track in the middle of nowhere-was essentially worthless 
unless the railroad remained intact. As a result, bondholders who 
under other circumstances might have fiercely resisted managers' 
efforts to reorganize 107 had every bit as much to gain from keeping the 
railroad intact as its managers and shareholders did. 
With strong ideological and interest group support for preserv-
ing railroads and with legislative or executive solutions largely fore-
closed, railroad managers, through their lawyers and investment 
bankers, turned to the only obvious alternative: the judicial system. 108 
In effect, managers and their advisers took creditors' state law debt 
collection remedies and turned them inside out to fit the needs of 
troubled railroads . In a pattern that reorganization lawyers perfected 
through time, the railroad would arrange for a friendly creditor 
(generally an out-of-state creditor, to create federal diversity 
jurisdiction) to file a creditor's bill asking for the appointment of a 
receiver. 109 Rather than preparing to liquidate assets, as a creditor's 
106. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 95, at 699 (the "fact is that only a financial wiz-
ard . .. could have sorted out the property represented by the mortgages of the numerous 
railroads which comprised the Wabash"). 
107. Secured creditors and mortgage holders generally are viewed as having little to gain 
through a manager-driven bankruptcy reorganization process. At best, they are made no worse 
off than in liquidation, and in reality their interests are impaired in a variety of ways. For a 
discussion, see Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay 
on Bankruptcy, Sharing, and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 187-89 (1989). 
108. Perhaps more accurately, the railroads' lawyers and bankers used the judicial system 
to effectuate what in many respects was a negotiated workout-i .e., private ordering. For an 
argument that the early railroad receivership practice reflected a gradual shift from paternalis-
tic efforts by bankers to act as trustees for scattered bondholders to private ordering through 
contract, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American 
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 101-08 
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983). 
109. Paul D. Cravath, one of the leading lights in the reorganization bar, described the 
standard procedure in detail in a much-cited article. Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of 
Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153 (1917) [hereinafter 1 SOME 
LEGAL PHASES]. The Cravath firm played a central role in the railroad receiverships from the 
beginning, and was one of several Wall Street firms whose elite status was closely tied to their 
reorganization practice. The firm's history, written by Cravath's successor as the firm's (and 
arguably the nation's) most prominent reorganization lawyer, gives much of the flavor of the 
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bill contemplated, the receivers , who generally included members of 
the railroad's management, worked out the terms of a 
reorganization.U0 At the same time, the railroad's investment 
bankers formed bondholder "protective committees" and attempted to 
persuade the bondholders to deposit their securities with the 
committee, which would commit the bondholders to the terms of the 
eventual reorganization. Once everything was in place, the bonds and 
other security interests were foreclosed and the railroad's assets were 
"sold" in a foreclosure sale. In reality, the "sale" simply effected a 
reorganization of the railroad's capital structure.lll The judges who 
oversaw this manipulation of liquidation procedures knew exactly 
what was going on112 but the pressure to reorganize the railroads was 
so strong that they routinely approved the reorganizations. 113 
This is not to say that railroad receiverships proved to be one 
big happy party for everyone. The parties negotiated aggressively 
early successes. ROBERT T. SWAINE, 2 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819-1948, 
at 167-75 (1948) (describing "Frisco" reorganizatiOn). 
110. Because even federal courts did not have jurisdiction over out-of-state property, it was 
necessary to set up ancillary receiverships in each of the districts where the railroad had prop-
erty. See, e.g., James Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Court, 
in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES, supra note 109, at 77, 78-79 . 
111. For another recent article describing the equity receivership process in the context of a 
defense of current Chapter 11, see Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An 
Overview of the Law and Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). One commentator has argued that, if existing creditors had 
been precluded from bidding at the foreclosure sale, third-party bidders might have made bids, 
and a liquidation-based regime might have emerged. See Jeffrey Stern, Note, Failed Markets 
and Failed Solutions: The Unwitting Formulation of the Corporate Reorganization Technique, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 800-01 (1990). 
It is important to keep in mind that the equity receivership process took place entirely 
outside of the federal bankruptcy laws. It was not until the 1930s that Congress added an 
effective manager-driven reorganization provision to the Bankruptcy Act. 
112. Commentators roundly criticized the collusive nature of jurisdiction and the artificial-
ity of the ostensible foreclosure "sale" early on. See, e.g., D.H. Chamberlain, New Fashioned 
Receiverships, 10 HARV. L. REV. 139, 141 (1896). For a later, rather colorful critique of the 
practice, see Jerome Frank, Some Realistic Refiections on Some Aspects of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 19 VA. L. REV. 541 (1933); William H. Taft, Recent Criticism of the Federal 
Judiciary, 18 A.B.A. REP. 237, 260-64 (1895). 
113. In the most notorious of all the railroad receiverships, the Wabash-notorious because 
the railroad's managers dispensed with the pretense of creditor action and simply requested the 
receivership themselves-Judge Treat alluded to this pressure in justifying his decision to honor 
the railroad's request: 
[Unless a creditor acts] the court must either stop running the road, or an expenditure 
be made for the benefit of all parties in interest ... in order that it shall be made a going 
concern. Otherwise, in the expressive language of a distinguished friend, you have 
nothing but a streak of iron-rust on the prairie. 
Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, 29 Fed. 618, 626 (E.D. Mo. 1886). For a vigorous criticism of the 
Wabash case, see Chamberlain, supra note 112, at 143-46. For an argument that the judges in 
the equity receivership cases had an ideological interest in promoting the development of 
railroads, see GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917, at 55-60 (1994). 
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over their respective stakes in the reorganization. General creditors 
increasingly complained that the railroad's managers, shareholders, 
and bondholders were colluding to squeeze them out. The Supreme 
Court agreed in several cases that eventually produced bankruptcy's 
absolute priority rule. 114 At the same time, however, the Court 
consistently upheld the equity receivership device for reorganizing 
railroads .115 
The late nineteenth century also was a time of great transition 
in corporate law generally. Mter carefully doling out charters in the 
early nineteenth century, states began to grant them much more lib-
erally by the middle decades. 116 The late nineteenth century saw the 
emergence of the great trusts and a much more market-based (and 
quite controversial) corporate law as technology supported large-scale 
enterprise. 117 It was the rapid expansion of railroads and other 
business ventures, and managers' efforts to address the financial 
distress that sometimes ensued, which continued to create pressure 
for manager-driven corporate reorganization. 
C. The 1920s: Cracks in the Reorganization Wall 
The same Wall Street bankers and lawyers who perfected the 
railroad receivership form in the 1870s continued to dominate the 
receivership practice in the early twentieth century as advisors to 
debtors and the bondholder protective committees set up to effect a 
reorganization. The reorganizers also continued to wrestle with many 
of the issues that had arisen earlier-most prominently, how dis-
senting creditors were to be treated and how strictly priorities were to 
be construed-but by 1908, the validity of the process as a whole was 
clear. 118 
114. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (holding that unsecured 
creditor cannot be squeezed out); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany, & Chicago Ry. 
Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899) (same). The absolute priority rule prohibits lower priority creditors and 
shareholders from retaining any interest unless higher priority creditors are paid in full. 
115. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 228 U.S. at 509-10; In re Metropolitan Ry. 
Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 112 (1908); Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 689. 
116. See Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 483; see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-
Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
129 (1985). 
117. For an argument that the Supreme Court's rejection of Sherman Act challenges to the 
sugar trust reflected a belief that states should regulate merger activity, and that the states' 
failure to do this facilitated the trusts' expansion, see Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar 
Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporate Law, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. 
REV. 304 (1979). 
118. In 1908, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the jurisdictional basis for railroad re-
ceivership. See In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S . at 112. 
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At first glance the routinization of receiverships might suggest 
that manager-driven bankruptcy, and perhaps even an overall system 
of ex post corporate governance, was in place in the United States as 
of the early 1900s. This would be getting ahead of the story, however, 
in several respects. First, even with railroads, governance patterns 
deviated from the ex post paradigm of active markets and manager-
driven bankruptcy. A true ex post system requires not just a reor-
ganization option in bankruptcy, but also that managers have some 
control over the process.U9 Although managers had initially called the 
shots in important respects, at least in the days of larger-than-life 
owners like Jay Gould, creditors often controlled the receivership 
process in the early 1900s.12° From managers' perspective, the condi-
tions were closer to a manager-displacement regime than might in-
itially seem the case. 
Just as railroad receivership contained hints of an ex ante 
regime, so too did railroad governance. Although railroad securities 
were often widely held, the same creditors that controlled the bank-
ruptcy process-including J.P. Morgan and Company and other 
banks-also figured prominently outside of receivership. In addition 
to their role as bankers, they often held substantial amounts of 
securities and served on the board, much as Japanese and German 
banks do today. 121 
Why did managers relinquish so much control to creditors 
during this time? The most obvious explanation is that a small group 
of investment banking firms controlled large scale financing. 122 One 
119. See supra Part II.B. 
120. Investment bankers exerted particular influence in the receivership process-often 
displacing existing management-from the late nineteenth century on. See Buckley, supra note 
105, at 743; see also E.G. CAMPBELL, THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RAILROAD 
SYSTEM, 1893-1900, at 145-82 (1938). J.P. Morgan and Company played an important role in 
several of the reorganizations. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 67-69. 
Receivership practice in this era paralleled in many respects the current landscape of 
Canadian corporate law. Canadian law, like American practice in the 1920s, includes a reor-
ganization option, but creditors exert much more influence over the process than in the current, 
manager-driven American regime. For an extensive comparison, see Lynn M. LoPucki & 
George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of 
Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HA.Rv. INT'L L.J. 267 (1994). 
121. Early efforts to neutralize the role of large financial intermediaries in corporate 
governance had already begun to take effect. In addition to New York's legislation prohibiting 
insurers from holding stock in the wake of the 1905 Armstrong investigation, the 1911-1912 
Pujo hearings (together with a desire to curry favor with President Wilson) prompted J.P. 
Morgan's partners to unilaterally resign from all of the corporate boards on which they had 
previously sat. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 180. Yet Morgan and other banks continued to 
retain enormous influence until the sweeping reforms of the New Deal. 
122. For a good summary of the debate as to whether the bankers' influence was benign or 
malignant, see DeLong, supra note 22, at 205. 
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possibility, then, is that managers had little choice but to cede control 
to J.P. Morgan or one of its counterparts if they wished to issue secu-
rities publicly. It is also quite possible that managers could diminish 
the risk of displacement through implicit side payments to the in-
vestment bank, as they do in Japan and Germany today. 
The second reason the ex post system was not fully in place in 
the early 1900s, at least on the bankruptcy side, is that the develop-
ments we have considered all involved railroads. Equity receiverships 
could easily be adapted to non-railroad corporations, and they made 
sense as a response to these firms' financial distress. Yet the impulse 
toward manager-driven reorganization was weaker in several re-
spects. Most importantly, the perception that railroads were public in 
nature and could not be allowed to fail simply did not apply to many 
non-railroad corporations. As with ideological concerns, the interest 
group dynamic also played out somewhat differently. Whereas rail-
roads were vastly more valuable as going concerns than in liquida-
tion, this was not so self-evidently true with other corporations. 
Thus, there was much less of an obvious consensus in favor of man-
ager-driven reorganization. 
Starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began hinting that 
railroads were a special case, and that the Court had serious doubts 
about other firms' use of the receivership process. In Harkin v. 
Brundage, the Court suggested that it would not simply rubberstamp, 
in non-railroad cases, the collusive techniques that managers and 
their professionals used in railroad receiverships to establish 
jurisdiction.123 The Court was still more explicit in Shapiro v. Wilgus, 
where it indicated that these techniques passed muster in railroad 
cases only because railroads were "public service corporation[s]" 
whose "service[s were] in furtherance of the public good."124 The Court 
went on to say that "[ w ]e have given warning more than once ... that 
the remedy [when only private interests are at stake] is not to be 
granted loosely, but is to be watched with jealous eyes."125 
123. 276 U.S. 36, 52 (1928). 
124. 287 U.S. 348, 356 (1932). 
125. Id. The Court returned to this theme yet again in First Nat'l Bank v. Flershem, 290 
U.S. 504 (1934), where Justice Brandeis noted that "[a]ll of the cases in which this Court 
appears to have [upheld the use of an equity receivership] in aid of reorganization upon the 
ground of insolvency dealt with railroads or other public utilities where continued operation of 
the property . .. seemed to be required in the public interest." Id. at 515 n.7. 
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As of the late 1920s, then, the status of manager-driven receiv-
ership for non-railroad corporations was uncertain. 126 Far from em-
bodying a clear ex post character, American corporate governance, 
with the continuing influence of the much criticized "Money Trust" 
banks, had in many respects shifted in an ex ante direction. 
D. Remaking American Bankruptcy Law in a New Deal Image 
In the standard account of American bankruptcy law, ex post 
bankruptcy began with the bankruptcy reforms of the New Deal. As 
bankruptcy scholars are quick to note, these reforms eliminated the 
problems that had bedeviled the jerry-rigged receivership process and 
established a reorganization-based bankruptcy system once and for 
all. As we have seen, in the political account of American corporate 
governance, the New Deal financial reforms played a central role in 
fragmenting financial intermediaries and reifying the patterns we see 
in publicly held corporations. 127 To the extent that flexible, reorgani-
zation-based bankruptcy took permanent form in the 1930s, these 
developments strongly confirm the complementary relationship be-
tween market-driven corporate governance and manager-driven 
bankruptcy, exemplifying one part of the system developing in 
tandem with the other. 
As convenient as this account is, it is nevertheless misleading 
in important respects. Rather than a single set of reforms, for in-
stance, the New Deal bankruptcy reforms proceeded in two distinct 
steps, the first culminating in 1933 and 1934 and the second in 1938. 
Moreover, while these reforms did eliminate some of the obstacles to 
reorganization under the equity receiverships, the 1938 reforms 
added manager-displacing provisions that largely reversed the effect 
of codifying manager-driven reorganization. 
The analysis that follows views the New Deal bankruptcy re-
forms through the lens of the three factors we have been considering. 
On the legislative side, bankruptcy lawyers and New Deal reformers 
are the principal interest groups. The most significant surprise is the 
relative silence of corporate managers. Although managers actively 
responded to shifts in the background regime, they added their voices 
to the legislative debates much less than one might have predicted. 
126. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act , 48 
HARv. L. REV. 39, 42-45 (1934) (discussing the "waxing doubt [due to the Supreme Court pro-
nouncements] as to the validity of the procedural device") . 
127. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. 
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1. Codifying Corporate Reorganization: Sections 77 and 77B 
All of the New Deal bankruptcy reforms can be traced to the 
Thacher Report, which, together with the earlier Donovan Report, 
presented the findings of a widespread investigation commenced in 
1929.128 The investigation found evidence of substantial administra-
tive corruption. To remedy this, the Thacher Report recommended 
sweeping changes to the powers and compensation of bankruptcy 
referees and trustees, and the creation of a bankruptcy 
administrator. 129 The Thacher Report also proposed that a new, 
manager-driven, corporate reorganization provision be added to the 
Bankruptcy Act. 130 
Lawmakers immediately converted the Thacher Report rec-
ommendations into proposed legislation, and the House and Senate 
judiciary committees held extensive joint hearings on the legislation 
in early 1932.131 In contrast to subsequent congressional activity, the 
joint hearings focused almost exclusively on personal bankruptcy and 
administrative structure. 132 Although it was clear that the proposals 
were too controversial for serious consideration in 1932, an election 
year, a more limited bill covering personal bankruptcy, corporate 
reorganization, and railroad reorganization was quickly introduced in 
the House in January 1933. 
128. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: THE REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, S. Doc. No. 72-65 (1932) [hereinafter 
THACHER REPORT]. The Donovan Report, 71ST CONG., REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATES (Comm. Print 1931) [hereinafter DONOVAN REPORT], focused on adminis-
trative abuses in the bankruptcy system. The investigation continued when Judge Thacher, a 
principal contributor to the Donovan Report, became Solicitor General under President Hoover. 
Using the Donovan Report findings as a backdrop, the Thacher Report proposed wide-ranging 
changes to the Bankruptcy Act. 
129. See THACHER REPORT, supra note 128, at 104-07 (administrators), 110-23 (trustees), 
123-25 (referees). 
130. See id. at 90. Interestingly, the Thacher Report was commissioned during the Hoover 
administration while many of the reforms it proposed were adopted under Roosevelt. William 
Douglas' involvement spanned both eras, first through his work investigating personal 
bankruptcy and later on the protective committee project he spearheaded with the SEC. 
131. See Joint Hearings on S. 3866 Before the Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1932) [hereinafter 1932 Hearings]. 
132. The principal interest groups who testified in the hearings were: the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, represented by Lloyd Garrison, who proposed and defended the bill; general bank-
ruptcy lawyers (individually and through organizations such as the American Bar Association), 
who vehemently opposed the bill as making unnecessary changes to a generally effective 
system; organizations of various trade creditors, who enthusiastically supported the 
bill-particularly its provision to appoint an executive branch administrator to monitor cases; 
and bankruptcy referees, whose views were somewhat mixed on issues other than strengthening 
their authority. It appears to have been the lawyers' unified opposition that doomed the bill. 
1998] AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1363 
By this time pressure to take action had mounted. With no 
further hearings and relatively little debate, the House approved the 
entire bill and passed it on to the Senate. 133 After initially dropping 
the corporate and railroad reorganization sections from the bill, 134 
Senator Daniel Hastings reintroduced Section 77, the railroad reor-
ganization section. In February 1933, the Senate passed the proposed 
bill, including the railroad section, despite concerns that it was acting 
too quickly and that it should go further and give the Interstate 
Commerce Commission ("ICC") complete control over distressed 
railroads. 135 With the President's signature in March, the legislation 
became law .136 
In addition to bringing railroads within the Bankruptcy Act for 
the first time, Section 77 made several other important changes. It 
provided that dissenters would be bound by a two-thirds vote of their 
class; 137 it also gave the ICC authority to propose trustees, to set lim-
its on compensation, and most significantly, to pass judgment on any 
proposed reorganization plan. 138 
With railroad reorganization taken care of, Congress tumed its 
attention to corporate reorganization. After cursory hearings before 
the House Judiciary Committee,139 Congress debated the proposed 
corporate reorganization section in early 1934.140 Like Section 77, 
133. See 76 CONG. REC. H2931-32 (1933). 
134. See 76 CONG. REC. S4876 (1933). In addition to Section 77, the railroad reorganization 
provision, the bill also included new sections governing compositions-i.e., negotiated 
compromises of debt terms with creditors-for individuals (Section 7 4) and farmers (Section 75). 
135. The railroad amendment passed by a vote of 42-15 (excluding paired votes), see 76 
CONG. REC. S5134 (1933), and the bill as a whole then passed by a vote of 44-8 (excluding pairs), 
see 76 CONG. REC. S5136 (1933). Thereafter, the House agreed to the bill, as amended in 
several respects by the Senate, by a vote of 207-26. See 76 CONG. REC. H5360 (1933). 
Several senators complained that the railroad provision had not been given sufficient study, 
and that only Senator Hastings understood its terms. See, e.g., 76 CONG. REC. S4884 (Feb. 24, 
1933) (Senator Bratton, another member of the three senator subcommittee considering the 
railroad provision, noting that only Hastings focused on the provision); see also Max Lowenthal, 
The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 HARv. L. REV. 18, 22 (1933) (complaining that the 
provision was passed too quickly and included insufficient safeguards). 
136. See Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204 § 77, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933) (codified prior to repeal at 
11 u.s. c. § 204 (1934)). 
137. The most important effect of the voting requirement was to eliminate the obligation to 
pay dissenting creditors in cash. 
138. Section 77(e) (binding effect of two-thirds vote); 77(c) (appointment of trustees); 77(f) 
(expenses). 
139. The House Judiciary Committee considered the corporate reorganization provision 
briefly at the end of lengthy hearings on municipal bankruptcy. See Hearing on H.R. 1670, etc, 
5009, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter Section 
77B Hearing]. 
140. Much of the Senate debate was unrelated to the corporate reorganization provision 
itself, focusing on farm relief proposed by Senator Frazier and including a lengthy filibuster by 
Senator Huey Long when it was clear the farm amendment would fail. See 77 CONG. REC. 
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Section 77B provided for the binding of dissenters through a classwide 
vote. The new section differed, however, in one dramatic respect: it 
did not provide for governmental oversight parallel to the role of the 
ICC in railroad reorganization. 14 1 
This was how manager-driven corporate and railroad reorgani-
zation became part of the Bankruptcy Act and equity receiverships 
came to an end. Notice that these reforms occurred at precisely the 
same time as Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 
As is often the case, the backdrop of each of these changes was 
a dramatic price shock-here, the onset of the Depression and the 
wave of failures it produced. 142 The Depression had an obvious effect 
on the structural constraints that had forced the managers of troubled 
railroads in a judicial direction in the nineteenth century. Whatever 
the constitutional limitations, there was a widespread view that 
Congress must take action. 143 Thus, structural constraints and ideo-
logical considerations both strongly influenced the legislative turn 
that bankruptcy reform took in the early 1930s. 
While this much is old hat, the plot thickens when we consider 
the role of interest groups in the enactment of Sections 77 and 77B. 
The single most active interest group was the reorganization bar, 
which vigorously supported codification of corporate reorganization. 144 
In at least one respect the bar's support is puzzling. Wall Street 
lawyers had an enormous interest in the existing equity receivership 
practice. This interest would seem to give them ample reason to 
resist codification, since legislative action might undermine the value 
of their expertise with existing procedures or diminish the flexibility 
of the procedures. Why then were Wall Street lawyers so enthusiastic 
about codifying corporate reorganization? 
S8082 (1934) (farm amendment rejected); id. (bill passes Senate). The House, which had passed 
the provision the previous year, once again passed the bill with very little debate. See 77 CONG. 
REC. H5015 (1934). 
141. The most obvious reason for the difference between the railroad and corporate sections 
is that the ICC already had oversight authority over railroads, whereas no existing agency had 
previously (i.e., prior to the creation of the SEC in 1933) exercised authority over corporations. 
142. See NORTH, supra note 82, at 83-92 (noting the importance of price changes). 
143. See, e.g., ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 166~76 (1955) 
(describing desperate conditions of 1932 and pressure for federal action). 
144. Most prominently, Robert Swaine urged federal legislation in several speeches and 
articles. See, e.g. , Robert T. Swaine, Corporate Reorganization-An Amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium, 19 VA. L. REV. 317 (1933) [hereinafter Swaine, Corporate 
Reorganization]; Robert T. Swaine, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization: An 
Affirmative View, 19 A.B.A. J. 698 (1933) (reprinting speech) [hereinafter Swaine, Federal 
Legislation]. 
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One reason was that however lucrative ancillary receiverships 
were for professionals in the states where satellite receivers were 
needed, the Wall Street lawyers who quarterbacked the process saw 
them as a costly nuisance.145 Second, the existing receivership 
strategy required the managers of troubled firms and their lawyers to 
pay dissenting creditors in cash, which became increasingly difficult 
as the Depression dried up sources of capital. 146 The reorganization 
bar saw federal legislation as a way to eliminate both of these 
practical problems and at the same time remove the cloud of legal 
uncertainty hanging over the use of receiverships to reorganize non-
railroad firms. 147 
Closely allied with the reorganization bar-although less vis-
ible-were the Wall Street underwriters who played a central role in 
organizing protective committees, serving as receivers, and acting as 
underwriters for any securities issuance required for the reorganiza-
tion.148 
The biggest surprise, given their prominent place in equity 
receivership history, is that managers stayed well in the background 
in the legislative debates that produced Sections 77 and 77B. Debtors 
and potential debtors had an obvious interest in supporting legisla-
tion that made reorganization easier, and they lobbied directly from 
time to time. 149 But these appearances were much more the exception 
than the rule.150 
One possible explanation for managers' silence is that they 
could protect themselves more effectively in other ways, and thus had 
little need to promote manager-driven reorganization. If managers 
145. See, e.g. , Swaine, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 144, at 320-21 (noting 
inconvenience of ancillary receiverships and courts' use of process to dispense patronage); 
Friendly, supra note 126, at 46. 
146. See Swaine, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 144, at 326 (noting burden of paying 
cash to dissenters); Friendly, supra note 126, at 48 (same). 
147. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
148. Investment bankers did not testify in the hearings that produced Sections 77 and 77B. 
It was only in the subsequent reforms, particularly the abortive Lea Bill, that investment 
bankers played an active and visible role. An obvious explanation for this is that, unlike 
Sections 77 and 77B, the subsequent reforms directly attacked investment bankers' roles in 
corporate reorganizations. 
149. See Section 77B Hearing, supra note 139, at 207 (Representative Shannon of Missouri 
reads telegram urging reform as beneficial to the reorganization of Long Bell Lumber Co.). 
More often, the influence of managers can be seen indirectly. Senator Hastings, for instance, 
noted on several occasions that railroad executives supported the passage of Section 77. See, 
e.g., 76 CONG. REC. 85107 (1933) (emphasizing that the ICC and railroad executives approve of 
the reforms). 
150. Eric Posner found a similar dearth of lobbying by debtors and their managers in his 
extensive analysis of the political economy of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Eric Posner, The 
Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 54-55 (1997). 
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included generous severance provisions in their compensation, for 
instance, their employment contracts might counteract any concerns 
about bankruptcy, much as golden parachutes reduce target directors' 
aversion to takeovers. Yet severance rights have a crucial limitation. 
Severance payments would simply be treated as an unsecured claim 
in bankruptcy and thus wouldoffer only limited protection. 151 
The more likely explanation stems from managers' bounded 
foresight. Most managers do not anticipate that their firm will fail, so 
they see little reason to lobby prior to failure. Further, although the 
managers of current debtors care deeply about the parameters of 
bankruptcy law, they generally will not benefit from subsequent 
reform. 152 From this perspective, the fact that potential debtors 
played at least a background role can be seen as a tribute to the depth 
and severity of the Great Depression. 
Another surprise in the legislative history of Sections 77 and 
77B is that the New Deal reformers offered precious little resistance 
to these reforms, despite the fact that the most obvious beneficiaries 
were managers and Wall Street professionals. 153 Although they were 
enacted at precisely the same time as Glass-Steagall and the 
Securities Acts, the reorganization provisions protected most aspects 
151. Managers could ensure a much greater recovery by taking a security interest to collat-
eralize the severance payments, but I have not seen evidence that managers have ever done 
this. Bankruptcy attorneys sometimes insist on security to assure priority in bankruptcy. See, 
e.g., In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (law firm with mortgage on debtor property). 
152. In view of this, it is not surprising that the debtors who did lobby were principally con-
cerned about transition effects. Thus, some debtors hoped legislation would affect their existing 
reorganization effort, see, e.g., Section 77B Hearing, supra note 139, at 207 (telegram supporting 
reform as beneficial to the reorganization of Long Bell Lumber Co.); others hoped to avoid 
coming changes, see, e.g., 77 CONG. REC. S13,769 (1935) (Senator Barkley successfully intro-
ducing amendment during 1935 debates making clear that new mandatory trustee requirement 
included in the 1935 revisions to Section 77 would not apply to existing reorganizations). 
The concern with transition effects was equally pronounced in the later hearings that led to 
the Chandler Act in 1938. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong. 164 (1937) (statement of William 0. Douglas, SEC 
Chairman) (arguing that the reforms should be applied to pending cases) [hereinafter 1937 
House Hearings]; id. at 290 (statement of Alfred N. Heuston, Bar Association of New York City) 
(arguing against application to current cases). 
153. This would change dramatically later in the 1930s, but at this point there were only a 
few lone voices excoriating corporate managers, Wall Street underwriters and the reorganiza-
tion bar. One reformer who was quite vocal, even early on, was Max Lowenthal. Lowenthal's 
book, The Investor Pays, which focused on the St. Paul railroad receivership, sharply criticized 
underwriters and the reorganization bar. MAx LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933). He was 
similarly critical in several law review articles. See, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 135, at 22 
(criticizing the railroad reorganization provision). 
For an explanation of one prominent reformer's silence, see Letter from William 0. Douglas 
to E. Merrick Dodd, William Douglas Papers, Container No. 5, Library of Congress (Jan. 29, 
1934) (commenting on Dodd's concerns about Section 77B and suggesting that "any opposition 
would be more effective if it envisaged a rather definite alternative"). 
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of existing practice. Principally due to efforts of the ICC, Section 77 
did attempt to curb bankers' fees by subjecting them to ICC 
oversight, 154 and it gave the ICC a central role in the proceedings. But 
Section 77B, the general corporate reorganization provision, did not 
provide for any additional governmental oversight. 155 Moreover, both 
sections gave the reorganization bar and their clients, debtors' 
managers, much of what they wanted: reorganization would bind 
dissenters, and existing management would often remain in control. 
The stunning success of the reorganization bar can be attrib-
uted to several important distinctions between corporate bankruptcy 
and the other governance reforms taking place at the same time. 
Probably the most important distinction was ideological. Whereas 
ideology sounded a consistent theme in the latter context-that it was 
time to rein in the Wall Street bankers-its influence on bankruptcy 
reform was somewhat more nuanced. Concerns about big business 
and the excessive control of bankers abounded, but they competed 
with a widespread perception that something must be done quickly to 
rescue large numbers of railroads and other corporations that were on 
the verge of collapse. 1s6 
A second distinguishing factor was the very different interest 
group dynamic. In the banking and securities reforms, Wall Street 
banks were aligned against both the reformers and a powerful inter-
est group-small town banks-that would benefit enormously if the 
Wall Street banks were crippled. Because no similarly powerful 
154. Section 77 gave the ICC authority to set maximum amounts for fees, but both reform-
ers and the reorganization bar suspected that the parties could circumvent the strictures 
through contractual provisions that provided for fees explicitly. See Lowenthal, supra note 135, 
at 52-56 (reformer concerned that the oversight would prove ineffective); Churchill Rodgers & 
Littleton Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 587 (1933) (attorneys confident the strictures could be avoided). 
155. For a note of alarm on this score, see Joseph L. Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: 
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1173, 1195 (1934) ("[L]ooking at Section 
77B as New Deal legislation, it leaves much to be desired .... [I]t may fairly be said that the 
operation of equity receiverships ... was not made the subject of any extensive inquiry."). See 
also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 35 HARV. 
L. REv. 1100, 1135 (1935) (Section 77B, "taken as a whole, seems more nearly to embody the 
views of reorganizers than any other group"). 
156. Thus, one or two legislators complained that Section 77 would simply help out corpo-
rate debtors, rather than helping small investors, see, e.g., 76 CONG. REC. H2918 (Jan. 23, 1933) 
(remarks of Rep. Dies); yet both legislators and commentators voiced the view that bankruptcy 
relief for corporations was one of only two ways of dealing with the Depression (inflating the 
currency being the other), see 77 CONG. REC. S7902 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Shipstead); George 
G. Battle, The Enactment of the New Bankruptcy Law Will Check the Tendency Toward 
Currency Inflation, 19 VA. L. REV. 340,340-42 (1933). 
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interest group played an analogous role in bankruptcy reform, the 
reformers did not have an obvious ally in their efforts. 157 
If the new railroad and corporate reorganization sections 
marked the end of New Deal reform, we would have a particularly 
tidy account of how Congress locked in ex post governance by frag-
menting banks and codifying manager-driven corporate reorganiza-
tion at the same time. Rather than stopping with Sections 77 and 
77B, however, Congress adopted far more sweeping reforms in the 
years that followed. 
2. New Deal Reform in Full Bloom: The Chandler Act of 1938 
It was perhaps inevitable that Congress would soon overhaul 
its work from the 1930s. The new manager-driven reorganization 
framework had been adopted in great haste and many members of 
Congress viewed it from the beginning as a stop-gap measure. 158 
Congress first revisited the regulation of railroad reorganiza-
tion in Section 77. Mter relatively extensive hearings in early 1935,159 
Congress quickly passed amendatory legislation. 160 The most impor-
tant amendments, all of which had been urged by the ICC, made the 
appointment of trustees mandatory; provided a cramdown procedure 
to facilitate reorganizations favored by the ICC even if one or more 
classes voted the plan down; and reinforced the ICC's control over the 
payment of expenses. 161 
157. The effect of these differences is particularly striking if we consider that Section 77, 
with its overlay of ICC oversight, was enacted at the end of President Hoover's term, whereas 
Section 77B, which gave the reorganizers even more of what they wanted, bore President 
Roosevelt's signature. 
158. Thus, by the time the SEC neared completion of the protective committee study 
Congress had commissioned in 1934, much more dramatic changes were in store. 
159. See Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 
6249, 74th Cong. (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Railroad Hearings] . 
160. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 74-381, 49 Stat. 911 (1935) 
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1935)). 
161. The initial impetus for revisiting Section 77 was the ICC's concern that railroads were 
simply languishing in bankruptcy. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF 
TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 74-89 (1935) (recommending changes). Few corporations 
reorganized, due apparently to shareholders' belief they would fare better if they waited out the 
Depression. The principal controversy in the hearings concerned the ICC's proposal that 
valuation be based on present and projected future earnings only-replacement values were 
explicitly excluded. Railroad shareholders (including controlling interests such as the Van 
Sweringens, who became notorious for the extensive railroad empire they built in the 1930s) 
feared that their interests would be wiped out under this standard. The bill as passed adopted a 
modified and slightly compromised version ofthe ICC provision. 
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Though dramatic in some respects, the amendments to Section 
77 could fairly be described as tinkering. 162 Section 77 continued to 
assume that managers would remain in place (together with a 
nonmanagement trustee), and thus remained largely manager-driven. 
Congress's amendments to Section 77B would go much further, and 
with the Chandler Act of 1938, would wrench the corporate 
reorganization provisions in a manager-displacing, ex ante direction. 
The deliberations that eventually led to the Chandler Act be-
gan when a group of academics and practitioners formed the National 
Bankruptcy Conference in order to address the many issues they 
believed were neglected by the 1933 and 1934 reforms. 163 Until the 
late 1930s, when the SEC entered the picture, the National 
Bankruptcy Conference's relatively technical proposals were the 
principal basis for discussion about additional amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Act. 164 
What spurred the SEC into action was a report Congress had 
commissioned from the SEC when it enacted the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.165 As William Douglas, who was given control of the 
report, investigated corporate reorganization prior to and under 
Section 77B, he became increasingly convinced that the practice was 
shot through with abuse. The report's most frequent targets were 
underwriters and the reorganization bar, who were depicted as more 
concerned with fees and keeping managers happy than with the in-
vestors they ostensibly represented. 166 
162. For a useful overview generally praising the changes though questioning the constitu-
tionality of the cramdown provision, see Henry J . Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad 
Reorganization Act, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 27 (1935). 
163. Among the organizations that spearheaded the National Bankruptcy Conference were 
the American Bar Association, the Commercial Law League, the National Credit Men's 
Association, and the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy. See Reuben G. Hunt, The 
Progress of the Chandler Bankruptcy Bill, 42 COMM. L.J. 195, 195 (1937). 
164. See, e.g., 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152 (statement of Rep. Chandler) 
(describing National Bankruptcy Conference efforts and subsequent proposal by SEC to 
completely overhaul Section 77B). 
165. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 4, 211, 48 Stat. 881, 885, 
909 (1934) . 
166. The report eventually filled eight volumes, 1-8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL 
AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937-40) [hereinafter SEC 
REPORT]. Critics challenged its breathless, "dime novel" tone, Robert T. Swaine, 
"Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 256, 259 (1938), and even 
Douglas himself noted that the report was as much a brief supporting the SEC proposals as an 
objective report, see 1937 House Hearings , supra note 152, at 199 (statement of William 0. 
Douglas, SEC Chairman) (describing the reports as "in the nature of briefs in favor of the 
Chandler Bill"); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The SEC's Reform Program for Bankruptcy 
Reorganization , 38 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225 (1938) (advocate of the reforms noting that the 
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Drawing almost verbatim from the proposals of the SEC re-
port, with at most the grudging acquiescence of the National 
Bankruptcy Conference, 167 the Chandler Act adopted two kinds of 
curatives in Chapter X, the chapter designed to address the reorgani-
zation of publicly held firms. The first curative was to end the per-
ceived hegemony of a debtor's managers and underwriters over corpo-
rate reorganization. Chapter X achieved this by essentially removing 
these insiders from the process altogether. Thus in every sizable case, 
Chapter X required that the debtor's current managers be replaced by 
a trustee. 168 Not only were underwriters and the firm's lawyers pro-
hibited from becoming the trustee, but their ability to manage the 
reorganization process and to shape its outcome was also eliminated. 
Chapter X permitted only the disinterested trustee, not the under-
writers or any other party, to propose a reorganization plan, 169 and it 
gutted the old protective committee process by prohibiting anyone 
from soliciting acceptances of a reorganization plan until the plan had 
been proposed by the trustee and approved by the court. 170 
reports are "essentially briefs" and "we should be on our guard against the easy assumption that 
the picture [the reports provide] ... is one which is in no need of retouching''). 
167. The National Bankruptcy Conference voted at a meeting in March 1937 to approve the 
SEC's corporate reorganization proposals, but as recounted by John Crl!rdes, the vote was 
extremely close and few National Bankruptcy Conference members were present at the time. 
See 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152, at 363-65 (remarks of John Gerdes). Several 
members of the conference actively criticized the reforms in the hearings, particularly the 
mandatory appointment of a trustee. See, e.g. , id. at 284 (statement of Alfred N . Heuston) 
(criticizing trustee provision and likelihood that SEC involvement would slow cases down). 
For its part, the SEC also compromised on several issues with the National Bankruptcy 
Conference in order to assure passage. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET 196 (1982) (SEC accepted provision that would allow relatively small creditors to initi-
ate a bankruptcy case). 
168. See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 156, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (1938) (codified prior to 
repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 156 (1938)). The Chandler Act permitted a court to appoint an existing 
manager as trustee, but required in such circumstances that a second, non-insider also be 
appointed. 
The mandatory trustee requirement was by far the most hotly contested provision in the 
Chandler Act. It drew vigorous criticism both in the hearings and in the dissenting report of a 
minority of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
REPORT ON H.R. 8046, S. REP. No. 75-1916 (1938). 
169. See Chandler Act § 169, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 569 
(1938)). For a discussion criticizing (delicately) the diminished role for private parties in 
negotiating a plan, see James N. Rosenberg, Reorganization: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 
25 VA. L. REV. 129, 144, 146 (1938). 
170. See Chandler Act § 169, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 569 
(1938)). 
The Lea Bill, which would have amended the Securities Act of 1933 to give the SEC wide 
ranging powers to regulate protective committee activity in bankruptcy, would have imposed 
even more draconian restrictions. For a description of the Lea Bill Proposals, see John Crl!rdes, 
Section 77B, The Chandler Bill and other Proposed Revisions, 35 MICH. L. REV. 361, 368-73 
(1937). See Cloyd LaPorte, Note, Changes in Corporate Reorganization Procedure Proposed by 
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In addition to shutting insiders out of the process, the 
Chandler Act also gave broad-ranging authority to the SEC to ensure 
that investors' interests were adequately represented. To facilitate 
SEC advocacy, Chapter X gave the Commission standing to act as a 
party in interest at any point. Chapter X also required that any reor-
ganization plan in a case over $3 million be submitted to the SEC for 
comments prior to confirmation. 171 
The effect of the reforms was to completely transform Section 
77B and the equity receivership process that had inspired it. In place 
of manager-driven bankruptcy, the reformers interposed a harsher, 
manager-displacement regime. The reformers' vision did not entirely 
replace other perspectives. The Chandler Act preserved the reorgan-
izers' original goal of providing a mechanism for binding dissenters. 
Furthermore, in what may have been in part a concession to the 
National Bankruptcy Conference, it limited the SEC to an advisory 
role, 172 rather than giving it the kind of regulatory oversight the ICC 
had wielded in railroad reorganizations. 173 But there was little 
question as to whose vision Chapter X of the Chandler Act reflected. 174 
In form, the Chandler Act preserved the ex post negotiation 
process that had developed in the equity receivership era and had 
been codified in Section 77B. But the Chandler Act dramatically 
changed the tenor of the process from manager-driven bankruptcy to 
a manager-displacement approach. Stated differently, the Chandler 
Act superficially resembled a flexible bankruptcy regime, since it 
contemplated reorganization of troubled firms. However, its 
manager-displacement presumptions gave managers an enormous 
the Chandler and Lea Bills, 51 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1938). After extensive hearings in June and 
July, 1937, the bill died, leaving the Chandler Act as the single source of regulation. 
171. See Chandler Act § 172, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 582 
(1938)). 
172. See 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152, at 146 (statement of Jacob Weinstein) 
(suggesting the SEC agreed to be limited to an advisory role). 
173. Of particular importance for subsequent developments, the SEC largely limited its 
focus to Chapter X's provisions for large corporations. In consequence, the National Bankruptcy 
Conference and the bankruptcy attorneys it represented got nearly everything they wanted in 
the other provisions of the Chandler Act, including those dealing with smaller corporations. 
This fact will figure prominently in the discussion of the developments of the 1950s. See infra 
Part III.E. 
174. One of the most far reaching implications of the Chandler Act is that it altered the 
interest group dynamic in American corporate bankruptcy in ways that have apparently never 
been fully recognized. By effectively cutting Wall Street bankers out of corporate reorganiza-
tion, the Chandler Act not only eliminated one previously important interest group, the bankers 
themselves, but it also ended the Wall Street reorganization bar's influence over corporate 
reorganization. Because the Wall Street firms' status was closely linked to that of their clients, 
the Wall Street banks, removing the banks opened up and eventually transformed bankruptcy 
practice. 
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incentive to avoid bankruptcy at all costs-precisely the incentive 
they have in an ex ante regime. 175 
E. Reinforcing Ex Post Governance in the 1950s 
Rather than a single, coherent governance framework, the 
New Deal left a striking tension in American corporate law. On the 
corporate governance side, New Deal financial reform laid the 
groundwork for ex post governance by limiting institutional investors' 
ability to hold and exercise large equity stakes in industrial corpora-
tions. By contrast, the Chandler Act introduced a harsh, manager-
displacing regime to bankruptcy. 
The evolutionary theory of this Article suggests that such a 
regime-mixing ex post corporate governance with ex ante bank-
ruptcy-is unstable. The theory predicts that subsequent develop-
ments would either push corporate governance in an ex ante direction, 
or managers would somehow reestablish a manager-driven bank-
ruptcy process. This is just what happened, as the second of these 
possibilities gradually won out. 
Although the economy emerged from the Depression in the 
1940s, it was the expanding peacetime economy of the 1950s that once 
again turned attention to the corporate governance issues Congress 
had legislated on during the 1930s. Stock market trading increased 
to levels that had not been seen since the 1920s, and buyers suddenly 
began to use the voting power their shares gave them to wage 
contests for corporate control-a trend traced by some to Robert 
Young's stunning victory in the battle for control of the New York 
Central Railroad in 1954.176 While the emergence of an active market 
for control is classic evidence of ex post governance, there was wide-
spread resistance to the increase in hostile takeovers. 177 There also 
175. In fact, it appears that the Chandler Act chilled filings and frequently caused liquida-
tion, particularly as compared to the current reorganization framework. This seems likely to be 
at least part of the explanation for Bradley and Rosenzweig's data suggesting that shareholder 
value declines more significantly under current law than under the Chandler Act regime. See 
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 
(1992) [hereinafter Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case]; Michael Bradley & Michael 
Rosenzweig, In Defense of Abolishing Chapter 11 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
176. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 508-11 (describing the proxy contest and characteriz-
ir>b it as an assault on previous norms of Wall Street behavior). Proxy contests were the hostile 
takeover device of choice in the 1950s. It was not until the 1960's that raiders began using 
tender offers, which proved more effective in practice. 
177. See Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management 
Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 46-48 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960) 
(noting and criticizing fact that "[r]aiding is regarded as something more than uncouth ... it is 
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remained the possibility that banks or other intermediaries might 
evade the restrictions on their involvement in corporate governance17B 
and that managers might welcome large, stable shareholders as an 
antidote to takeovers, as they have in Japan and Germany. 
By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, these issues were 
resolved in favor of market-driven governance rather than concen-
trated shareholding. Legislatively, Congress preempted banks' use of 
holding companies to circumvent the New Deal reforms by enacting 
the Holding Company Act of 1956. 179 Ideological factors such as the 
strong disfavor that would have met increasing involvement by banks 
and insurance companies in corporate affairs may also have 
discouraged these institutions from getting more involved. 18° Further, 
market trading remained strong, control contests continued, and 
firms increasingly used performance-based compensation to sharpen 
managers' focus on the performance of the firm's stock. 18 1 
Given the redoubled emphasis on an ex post approach to corpo-
rate governance in the 1950s, one might predict that managers would 
have found ways to evade the more draconian provisions of the 
Chandler Act-that is, that the upsurge in market-driven corporate 
governance would be accompanied by a shift in its bankruptcy law 
complement toward a more flexible, manager-driven regime. 182 This 
in fact is precisely what took place, through a remarkable sequence of 
events that ended the SEC's role as a major player in corporate 
reorganization. 183 
treated as almost illegal"); see also Bayless Manning, Jr., The American Stockholder, 67 YALE 
L.J. 1477, 1494 n.32 (1958) (bemoaning increase of takeovers). 
178. The chief threat came from the bank holding company structure, which banks had 
begun using as a means of circumventing branching restrictions. 
179. Roe discusses the Holding Company Act and its significance in freezing banks out of 
American corporate governance in ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 98-100. 
180. See, e.g., id. at 87 (noting insurance company fear of additional regulation). 
181. Randy Krozner has tracked the striking increase in corporations' use of stock and 
stock options, in the 1950s and thereafter, to align managers' interests with that of sharehold-
ers. See Randall Krozner, Were the Good Old Days that Good? (1997) (unpublished draft, on file 
with author). One reason for this may have been accounting changes in the 1950s that made it 
cheaper for firms to give their executives stock options. But the evolutionary theory of this 
Article suggests another reason: as the New Deal reforms eliminated banks' ability to serve as 
relational monitors, incentive compensation may have emerged, along with more active 
markets, as an alternative mechanism for reducing managerial agency costs. 
182. Another possibility is that managers would seek legislative protection from takeovers. 
This in fact is exactly what they did with the 1968 Williams Act and subsequent state anti-
takeover statutes. But these dampened rather than eliminated the takeover market. 
183. For further discussion of the events that follow and a public choice-based theory as to 
why the SEC disappeared, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy 
(1998) (unpublished draft, on file with author). 
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To appreciate how the SEC was outmaneuvered, one must first 
return to the structure of the Chandler Act itself. In addition to 
Chapter X, which was the focus of the SEC's attention, the Chandler 
Act also included a second reorganization chapter, Chapter XI. 184 In 
contrast to Chapter X's trustee requirement and pervasive govem-
ment oversight, Chapter XI left a firm's managers in control and did 
not provide for SEC intervention. 185 It was clear to everyone that 
Chapter X was designed for publicly held corporations and that 
Chapter XI was designed for small firms. Yet nothing in the 
Chandler Act precluded the managers of a large corporation from 
steering the firm toward the more hospitable waters of Chapter XI 
rather than filing under Chapter X, 186 a defect that the SEC and 
commentators noticed and decried almost immediately.187 
In the early years of the Chandler Act, the SEC appeared to 
have headed off managers' efforts to exploit this quirk in the legisla-
tion's draftsmanship. In SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement 
Co., the Supreme Court agreed with the SEC that the debtor in 
question could not use Chapter XI, and seemed to foreclose publicly 
held firms from that chapter.l88 Managers continued to push the 
boundaries of Chapter XI, however, and in General Stores Corp. v. 
Shlensky, Justice Douglas stunned the SEC by ruling that the choice 
of chapter depended on the "needs to be served."189 He made clear 
that even a publicly held corporation could invoke Chapter XI in an 
appropriate case. 190 Although the SEC won on the facts of Shlensky, 
the decision helped to ensure it would lose the war. By the 1960s and 
184. S ee Chandler Act ch. 11, 52 Stat. 840, 905-16 (1938) (codified prior to repeal at 11 
u.s.c. §§ 702-99 (1938)). 
185. Chapter XI was largely the work of the National Bankruptcy Conference, and was an 
outgrowth of the composition procedure that had long been part of the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter 
XI contemplated a scale-down of unsecured debt, and consequently did not permit either secured 
debt or equity interests to be altered. Congress amended the chapter in 1952 to make clear that 
Chapter XI, unlike Chapter X, did not require adherence to the absolute priority rule. The 
distinctions between the chapters are described in each of the Supreme Court decisions discused 
below, and in a third decision, SEC v. America Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S . 594, 603-07 (1965). 
186. Ironically, firms could be kept out of Chapter X because Section 130(7) required a 
showing that the firm could not obtain adequate relief under Chapter XI. For an excellent 
discussion, see Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate 
Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J . 1334, 1362 (1949). 
187. See id. at 1335 n.3. 
188. 310 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1940). 
189. 350 u.s. 462, 466 (1956). 
190. S ee id. One of many intriguing questions raised by the case is why Douglas, the 
former SEC chairman and architect of Chapter X, rejected the SEC's pleas that all publicly held 
debtors be steered into Chapter X. The most likely explanation is that the holding reflected 
Douglas' continued commitment to a flexible, "functionalist" approach to bankruptcy, and that 
Douglas never anticipated the SEC's ultimate demise. See Skeel, supra note 183. 
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early 1970s, the use of Chapter XI to reorganize publicly held firms 
had become increasingly routine. 191 
Why, in the two decades after the Chandler Act, did the SEC 
begin to lose its grip over the reorganization of publicly held 
corporations? To a certain extent the developments just described can 
be attributed to historical accident. Not only did the drafters neglect 
to explicitly steer public firms into Chapter X, but the United States 
Realty & Improvement Co. decision may actually have thwarted the 
SEC from closing the loophole. Prior to this case the SEC had 
proposed corrective legislation, but Congress refrained from acting 
based, apparently, on the view that legislative action was no longer 
necessary .192 
In addition to-and probably more crucial than-these events 
were several important institutional factors. The current managers of 
a troubled firm and their lawyers had strong incentives to try for 
Chapter XI, since this chapter would enable both to retain their posi-
tions.193 Given the obvious intent that public firms use Chapter X 
instead, one might not expect their prospects for success to be good. 
Yet the managers and lawyers had a significant advantage over the 
SEC in these jurisdictional disputes: the lower court judges who 
decided these cases may themselves have preferred Chapter XI, since 
Chapter X required the lower court to share authority with the SEC, 
and also introduced significant delay into the process. 194 Moreover, in 
the absence of a complicated capital structure or credible evidence of 
managerial misbehavior, the ideological case for insisting on the 
elaborate apparatus of Chapter X was weak. 195 
191. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT] ("it is readily apparent that 
Chapter XI has evolved into the dominant reorganization vehicle and very substantial debtors 
are able to reorganize in Chapter XI"). This does not mean that the SEC had no role when firms 
reorganized in Chapter XI. The SEC still could negotiate benefits for public investors in return 
for its agreement not to challenge the firm's use of Chapter XI. 
192. See H.R. REP. No. 76-2372, AT 2 (1940). 
193. An even better solution given the uncertainty of the gambit might be to do everything 
possible to avoid bankruptcy altogether. This suggests that the public firm managers who 
pushed for Chapter XI were likely to be those who simply could not avoid bankruptcy. 
194. See generally Allen F. Corotto & Irving H. Picard, Business Reorganizantions Under 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A New Approach to Investor Protections and the Role of the 
SEC, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, n.19 (1979) (noting that many of the appellate cases on the 
Chapter X-XI choice followed lower court denials of SEC motions to transfer to Chapter X). 
195. See, e.g., Melvin Robert Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate Reorganization: Chapter 
Xu. XI and the Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 171, 176-80 (1971) (arguing that 
Chapter X should be used in the event of serious allegations of managerial incompetence or 
fraud, but not as a matter of course). 
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It is important to emphasize that, even after Shlensky opened 
the doors to Chapter XI, the Bankruptcy Act fell well short of a pure 
ex post bankruptcy regime. Because the SEC continued to resist pub-
lic firms' use of Chapter XI, and frequently succeeded, managers faced 
significant uncertainty if the firm filed for bankruptcy. 196 
One could characterize American corporate governance during 
this time in similar terms. Corporate control contests had become far 
more frequent, but the market for control was still very much develop-
ing and faced a variety of impediments. 197 With these caveats in 
place, however, we can say with some confidence that the events of 
this era removed any serious doubts as to whether American corpo-
rate governance would develop in an ex ante or an ex post direction. 
By the end of this period, it became clear that market forces rather 
than large shareholders would predominate in corporate governance, 
and bankruptcy increasingly included a meaningful reorganization op-
tion. 
To underscore the significance of these developments for this 
Article's evolutionary story, consider a counterfactual example. 
Suppose managers and their lawyers had failed to circumvent the 
Chandler Act's manager-displacement provisions. How might firms' 
approach to corporate governance have developed differently? The 
analysis of this Article suggests that, in time, managers would have 
kept the debt in their firms' capital structures low to minimize the 
likelihood of bankruptcy, and turned increasingly to large 
shareholders to diminish the risk of takeovers. Similarly, the credible 
threat of manager-displacing bankruptcy would have reinforced 
investors' incentive to acquire large stakes in publicly held firms. On 
this reasoning, what might have emerged was, at least in theory, an 
ex ante approach to corporate governance. 
196. Mid-sized firms with publicly held securities, rather than large firms, first opened the 
doors to Chapter XI. See Benjamin Weintraub & Harris Levin, A Sequel to Chapter X or 
Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Middle-Sized Corporation, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 292 (1957) 
(developing this theory); Benjamin Weintraub et al., Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for 
the Middle-Sized Corporation, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 616 (1956) (same); Benjamin Weintraub & 
Harris Levin, Reorganization or Arrangement: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends in Recent 
Cases, 37 REF. J. 103 (1963) (same). 
197. In addition to a general corporate culture that still frowned on hostile raids in many 
respects, courts toyed with doctrinal devices that would have had a chilling effect on changes of 
control. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (suggesting buyers of 
controlling stock interests might be required to make same offer to minority shareholders); see 
also Rostow, supra note 177, at 46-48. 
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F. The View from the End of the Twen tieth Century 
Subsequent developments have strongly reinforced the ex post 
orientation of American corporate law. In bankruptcy the pivotal 
event came in 1978, when Congress completely overhauled the bank-
ruptcy laws by enacting the current Bankruptcy Code to replace the 
former Bankruptcy Act.198 
The Code's most important effect was to dramatically stream-
line bankruptcy's reorganization option-in ways that make it far 
more palatable to the managers of a troubled firm. Rather than two 
reorganization chapters, the Code includes only one-Chapter 11.199 
Not only does Chapter 11 all but eliminate the role of the SEC,Z00 but 
it also adopts a strong presumption that a firm's current managers, 
rather than a trustee, will be the ones to run the firm in bank-
ruptcy. 2o1 To smooth the road to reorganization, Chapter 11 also re-
laxes the requirements of the absolute priority rule. 202 
To appreciate Chapter 11's dramatic shift from the Chandler 
Act vision of corporate bankruptcy, the best place to start is with the 
single most influential interest group-bankruptcy lawyers. Because 
bankruptcy lawyers represent different kinds of clients-usually 
either creditors or debtors-they bring a variety of perspectives to 
bear. Yet, whatever their other differences, lawyers for both creditors 
and debtors are likely to favor a meaningful reorganization option, 
since their practice depends on it. 203 
198. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)). 
199. For a discussion in public choice terms of the debate whether to retain two corporate 
reorganization chapters or to enact only one, see Posner, supra note 150 at 108-118. 
200. The SEC retains the right to be heard in Chapter 11 cases, see Bankruptcy Code § 
1109, but it has no special authority to review plans or to exercise oversight in other ways. For 
a scathing criticism in the popular media of the Bankruptcy Code and its removal of SEC 
oversight, see Anne Colamosca, The Bankruptcy Hustle, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1979, at 15. 
201. Bankruptcy Code § 1101 treats the debtor as a "debtor-in-possession" when it files for 
Chapter 11 relief, and Bankruptcy Code § 1107 gives the debtor-in-possession all of the powers 
of a trustee. Trustees can only be appointed for cause, see Bankruptcy Code § 1104(a)(1), and 
their appointment in Chapter 11 is very much the exception, see Skeel, Nature, supra note 5, at 
512 n.199. 
202. Whereas Chapter X required that the absolute priority rule be satisfied in every case, 
the rule comes into play in Chapter 11 only with respect to a class of creditors or shareholders 
that votes against the reorganization plan. See Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b). 
203. In effect, bankruptcy lawyers serve as agents for their potential clients, creditors and 
debtors, in the lobbying process. But their agency is quite imperfect. Not only do attorneys 
reflect the views of actual debtors rather than healthy firms , but they also benefit from a costly 
bankruptcy process even if their clients do not. See Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and 
Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 381 (1992) (considering level of legal 
complexity that maximizes lawyers' income). 
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It is important to keep in mind that the bankruptcy bar that 
lobbied for the current Bankruptcy Code was quite different from the 
corporate reorganization bar of the 1930s. Ironically, by transforming 
the bankruptcy bar from a domain of elite Wall Street lawyers to a 
less prestigious but broader-based practice, the New Deal reformers 
may have enhanced the bar's influence. By the 1970s, the corporate 
reorganization bar was much larger and more difficult to attack as an 
insular elite. 
The managers of potential debtors were, even more than in the 
1930s, conspicuously absent from the legislative process. As dis-
cussed earlier, the most obvious explanation for their otherwise puz-
zling silence is that the representatives of potentially troubled debtors 
are unlikely to both recognize their status in advance and identify 
themselves. 204 
The only important interest group that sought to retain the 
more elaborate administrative apparatus of Chapter X was the SEC. 
But the SEC's influence was greatly diminished by this time and its 
cries for regulatory supervision of large corporation bankruptcies 
went unheeded. 205 
Ideology may also have played an indirect role in the 1978 
Code. Recall that two sometimes clashing ideological threads tend to 
come together in bankruptcy-a general antipathy toward large busi-
nesses and the desire to give failed businesses a second chance.206 By 
the 1970s, the former concern played little role (in part because banks 
and Wall Street law firms were a distant memory in bankruptcy). 
Congress was thus less troubled by the elimination of SEC oversight 
than it might otherwise have been, and the general background sen-
timent favoring reorganization of troubled businesses counseled for 
the more flexible reorganization provisions that eventually passed. 
The recent history of American corporate governance has 
tended in a very similar direction. The proxy contests of the 1950s 
gave way to takeovers in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, 
takeovers mushroomed due, among other reasons, to the advent of 
204. The contrast between bankruptcy and a hostile takeover is instructive in this regard. 
During the 1980s, the managers of many, and perhaps most, publicly held corporations saw 
their firms as potential takeover targets. Managers therefore lobbied vigorously in support of, 
and in fact generally initiated, the anti-takeover statutes that many states enacted. See 
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 136-38 (1987). 
Creditors generally supported the efforts to streamline reorganization, which they saw as a 
way to reduce the costs of the bankruptcy process. See Posner, supra note 150, at 117-18; see 
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) 
(arguing that creditors got what they wanted in chapter 11). 
205. See Posner, supra note 150, at 117-18. 
206. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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high-yield debt and the Justice Department's diminished use of the 
antitrust laws to challenge horizontal mergers during the Reagan 
presidency.207 At the same time, incentive-based compensation has 
become even more widespread, managers have increased the debt in 
firms' capital structures, and managerial and labor markets have 
become increasingly fluid. 208 There have been important counter-
trends as well-the most prominent being states' enactment of anti-
takeover statutes that significantly impede hostile takeovers. 209 But 
American corporate governance as a whole has all the indicia of a 
classic ex post system. 
This description of the evolution of ex post governance in 
America is not intended to suggest that a nation's corporate govern-
ance system will evolve relentlessly in an ex post or ex ante direction. 
Even in this condensed history of the American system, there are 
shifts in direction-as in the Chandler Act's reversal of the much 
broader reorganization option that had been provided under the 
short-lived Section 77B. In a more exhaustive history, one could ex-
plore many more examples of partial shifts. 
This Article intends, instead, to show how and why the ex post 
system now in place has developed as it has, and to support the claim 
that changes in the nature of corporate bankruptcy are likely to ac-
company corporate governance changes, and vice versa, due to the 
complementary relationship between them. As the analysis has sug-
gested, ex post corporate governance and bankruptcy have evolved 
together. While the correspondence is not perfect, developments 1n 
one have paralleled changes in the other at each stage. 
207. See Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Corporate Governance, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 374 (1996). 
208. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 6.2, at 200-06 (1986) (describing 
increased use of incentive compensation and tax changes influencing use of stock options); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from the International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1421, 1449-50 (1995) (describing increase in 
leverage between 1984 and 1991). 
209. The shifting stance of the Delaware courts toward hostile takeovers has been a 
similarly important factor. After imposing relatively stringent obligations on the directors of a 
target firm to consider unwanted takeover bids in the mid 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court 
gave directors more leeway at the end of the decade. For a discussion of Delaware decision 
making in corporate law with a particular emphasis on the court's takeover cases, see David A. 
Skeel, Jr., A Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporation Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997). 
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF EX ANTE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
AND GERMANY 
Having considered at some length the historical developments 
that have produced America's ex post corporate law framework, our 
focus will now shift to Japan and Germany. As with American corpo-
rate law, the secondary literature on the history of Japanese and 
German corporate law is still relatively undeveloped. Even with this 
constraint, the overview is quite suggestive. 
For both Japan and Germany, World War II was the pivotal 
event defining the current landscape of corporate law and corporate 
bankruptcy. In the wake of the war and the economic devastation it 
left, corporate governance patterns changed in important respects in 
both countries. This is not to say that the post-war period was a com-
plete break from the two countries' previous approaches to corporate 
law. To the contrary, the general trend in each nation prior to the 
war was in an ex ante direction. The post-war changes led in the 
same direction, though with striking adjustments in each country. 
A. Japan: Ex Ante Governance with a New Face 
Prior to World War II, the most striking feature of Japanese 
corporate governance was the prominence of a handful of 
zaibatsu-family dominated corporate groups that generally spanned 
several industries. Interestingly, recent research suggests that the 
zaibatsu controlled less of Japan's industry than is commonly 
believed, and that the securities markets served as a relatively 
important source of financing. 210 Nevertheless, corporate governance 
had strong ex ante characteristics, as the zaibatsu were family 
controlled and large shareholders took an active interest in managing 
most non-zaibatsu firms. 211 
The first major changes in the structure of the Japanese secu-
rities markets came in connection with the wartime planning of the 
1930s. Government initiatives designed to increase saving squeezed 
small shareholders out of the market, and the Japanese government 
actively intervened in corporate governance. 212 The government or-
210. See Okazaki, supra note 39, at 351-52 (only 10 of 60 of the largest mining and manu-
facturing firms were zaibatsu-related; 30-40 percent of the funds for all firms came from the 
capital markets). 
211. See id. at 352-54. 
212. See id. at 362-75. 
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ganized loan syndicates headed by the Bank of J apan213 and desig-
nated which financial institutions would finance each munitions cor-
poration.214 The overall effect was to greatly diminish market liquid-
ity and to reinforce the ex ante nature of Japanese corporate govern-
ance. 
Japanese bankruptcy followed a similar pattern. In the 
decades prior to World War II, Japanese lawmakers enacted two 
different composition provisions. The first was enacted in 1899,215 and 
the second dates to 1922.216 Both are simplified procedures designed 
only for small businesses. In striking contrast to the United States, 
there is little evidence of a movement to expand the bankruptcy 
process to facilitate the reorganization of large, troubled firms. Firms 
either resolved their financial distress privately or they were 
liquidated. 
By the time of the Allied Occupation, Japanese corporate gov-
ernance and corporate bankruptcy had developed in a decisively ex 
ante direction. With the Allied Occupation came a dramatically dif-
ferent impulse. During the occupation, the United States required 
Japan to enact many of our financial reforms. The Japanese version 
of Glass-Steagall drove a wedge between commercial and investment 
banking and imposed the same limits on stock ownership by 
banks-no more than five percent of any corporation-that American 
banks face. 217 On the bankruptcy side, Japan enacted Chapter X of 
the Chandler Act. 218 In short, the occupation imposed on Japan nearly 
all of the reforms from which America's ex post system subsequently 
emerged. 
Unlike the United States, however, Japanese corporate 
govemance never developed in an ex post direction. Although banks 
could hold only limited amounts of a corporation's stock, they evaded 
these limitations by participating in keiretsu-the extensive cross-
holdings that characterize many of Japan's most prominent 
businesses.219 Rather than discouraging this development, the 
213. See id. at 369. As Okazaki notes, there are obvious parallels between this practice and 
the main bank system that emerged after World War II. 
214. See id. at 371. 
215 . See Shoho (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, §§ 381 et seq. 
216 . See Wagiho [Composition act], Law No. 72 of 1922. Whereas the 1899 composition 
provisions were limited to corporations, the 1922 procedure is general in scope. For a brief but 
useful description of each, see Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish 
Chapter 11? The Evidence From Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 115-16 (1994). 
217. See, Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1951-52. 
218. See Kaisha Koseiho [Corporate reorganization act], Law No. 172 of 1952. 
219. See Gilson & Roe, Overlaps, supra note 39. 
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government has been an active participant. The government 
participates in the relational governance process through ongoing, 
informal contacts with the main banks and the firms they monitor. 220 
Thus, though the face of Japanese corporate governance looks much 
differ ent than it did before World War II , its ex ante characteristics 
have remained in full force. 
The path of Japan's corporate reorganization provisions has 
been entirely consistent with its ex ante corporate govemance. 
Whereas American firms began to evade Chapter X in the 1950s, 
.Japan has retained the full force of the provisions as originally 
enacted.22 1 The managers of a firm that invokes the provisions are 
invariably replaced by a trustee and the few troubled, publicly held 
finns that wind up in bankruptcy are nearly always liquidated.222 
The story thus far suggests that banks and the managers of 
large firms have consistently had their way in Japanese corporate 
governance, subject to ongoing government intervention. Yet this is 
not entirely the case. As in the United States, populist sympathies 
have periodically left their mark on corporate governance. Yet in 
striking contrast, the effect of populism has been to enhance the 
status of labor, without attacking either the influence of banks or the 
concentrated ownership of prominent firms . Thus, labor has long 
enjoyed a much greater voice in corporate governance in Japan than 
in the United States .223 Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe have recently 
speculated that lifetime employment may have emerged in the 1950s 
as an initiative by conservative businessmen designed to quell labor 
unrest that threatened to tum in a radical direction. 224 
Translating the developments just described into the institu-
tional terms used in Part III provides further insight into Japanese 
corporate governance and the way it has developed. First, consider 
the relevant interest groups. Banks and the managers of firms have 
been consistently influential, due both to the economic power they 
wield and to the close, symbiotic relationship between business and 
govemment-evidenced most vividly by the practice in smaller firms 
220. Milhaupt, supra note 61, at 28. 
221. See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 216, at 116 (corporate reorganization is based 
on former Chapter X and "is a rigid proceeding ... [that] almost always entails a change of man-
agement). 
222. See id. 
223. See Okazaki, supra note 39, at 363. 
224. See Ronald J . Gilson & Mark J . Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the 
Evolution of J apanese Corporate Governance, at 30-31 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (lifetime employment possibly used to "crack[ )labor solidarity"). 
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of appointing retiring bureaucrats to their boards. 225 The most visible 
competing interest group is labor. The ex ante system that has 
emerged can be seen as a compromise among the parties' interests. In 
return for protection against external threats such as takeovers, 
managers tolerate bank oversight and liquidation-based 
bankruptcy, 226 and labor tolerates financial concentration in return for 
benefits such as lifetime employment. 
Second, structural constraints reinforce the ex ante arrange-
ment. Japan's geography, particularly its small size and its political 
tradition of centralized power, have precluded the formation of influ-
ential local interest groups comparable to the local banks that have 
figured so prominently in American corporate law history. With the 
potential exception of labor, 227 there is no obvious, powerful constitu-
ency for fragmentation. Liquidation-based bankruptcy is a natural 
adjunct to this, since it cements the relationship between banks and 
the firms they monitor. 228 
Finally, and perhaps tautologically, ex ante governance can be 
seen as a reflection of the toleration of economic concentration and 
stigmatization of failure that form the ideological underpinnings of 
these historical developments. 
B. Germany: The Marriage of Banks and Business 
To understand the emergence of Germany's ex ante corporate 
governance framework, we must begin with that nation's 
longstanding pattern of powerful financial institutions. Dating back 
to the nineteenth century, German banks have wielded enormous 
power as financers and shareholders of German corporations. 229 
Prior to World War II, the attributes of ex ante governance 
were largely in place. On the corporate law side, banks and other 
large shareholders figured prominently in corporate governance, 230 
225. See Milhaupt, supra note 61, at 29. 
226. See Sheard, supra note 43, at 318-20 (describing protection from takeovers as an 
important characteristic of Japanese cross-shareholdings). 
227. Recall that in one account of Japanese labor history, labor was bought off, in effect, by 
business leaders' decision to implement lifetime employment. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 224, 
at 27-35. If lifetime employment were to disappear, as some predict, labor might more aggres-
sively challenge the current framework. 
228. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
229. See DeLong, supra note 22, at 228 ("the role played by the great banks in monitoring 
and supervising corporate managements was an accepted part of German financial theory in the 
years before World War I"); see generally Richard Tilly, Banking Institutions in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States in the Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries, 145 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 189 (1989). 
230. See DeLong, supra note 22, at 228. 
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while capital markets were insufficiently liquid to allow for ex post 
governance mechanisms such as takeovers. The German bankruptcy 
system was fully consistent with this. The principal bankruptcy stat-
ute, which dated to 1879, provided solely for piecemealliquidation. 231 
Like the rest of Germany's economy, the corporate governance 
framework was roiled by the years around World War II, which in-
cluded both hyperinflation and the economic devastation left by the 
war. At the end of the war, the capital markets were all but nonexist-
ent and most of Germany's business was in shambles. 232 It was in the 
rebuilding of the German economy that German corporate governance 
might plausibly have developed in a different direction, perhaps with 
active markets and a diminished bank role. But as in Japan, 
Germany retained its ex ante framework, and did so at least in part 
through a rapprochement between business leaders and labor. 
In Germany, rather than socializing or fragmenting industry, 
the government implemented co-determination on a national basis in 
1951.233 In addition to the "works councils" that already assured 
workers an audience with a corporation's management board, co-de-
termination provided direct representation for labor on the 
supervisory boards of substantial German corporations. 234 With co-
determination, workers expanded their voice in corporate governance, 
and any populist sentiment for fragmenting the nation's financial 
institutions was diffused. 
Developments in German bankruptcy law complicate the 
analysis slightly, but prove fully consistent with the version of ex ante 
231. The statute, the Konkursordnung (KO) was promulgated in 1877 and became effective 
on October 1, 1879. See Maximilian Schiessl, On the Road to a New German Reorganization 
Law-A Comparative Analysis of the Draft Proposed by the Insolvenzrechts Kommission and 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 235 (1988). 
232. See Jurgen G. Backhaus, Co-Determination in Germany: 1949-1979 and There 
Beyond: Bonding or Compulsion, at 2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
233 . "Co-determination" refers to mandatory representation of employees in corporate 
governance, usually on a corporation's board of directors. Co-determination did not emerge in 
Germany in 1951 for the first time. Board representation for employees had been implemented 
in 1922, and several German states had enacted co-determination provisions in the period prior 
to 1951. See id. at 2. 
234. Large German corporations generally have two boards, a management board (the 
"Vorstand") that makes most corporate decisions, and a supervisory board (the "Aufsichtsrat") 
that makes appointments to the management board and approves the annual dividend. For a 
useful description, see JONATHAN P. CLARKHAM, KEEPING GoOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF 
CORPORATE GoVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 17-25 (1994). 
Some commentators have argued that co-determination would not prove effective in the 
absence of a two-tier board, since the worker representatives on a single-tier board would be on 
both sides of labor negotiations. On a two-tier board, by contrast, the labor representatives 
serve on the supervisory board, whereas labor negotiates with the management board. See 
Backhaus, supra note 232, at 16. 
1998] AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1385 
governance that emerged on the corporate side. In 1935, Germany 
added a composition provision to its bankruptcy laws in response to 
repeated calls for a statutory mechanism for reorganizing troubled 
businesses. 235 Although the composition statute is, in form, a simpli-
fied reorganization provision, 236 in practice it immediately displaces 
managers and invariably leads to liquidation of large corporations 
that file for bankruptcy.237 
German bankruptcy law will include a much more extensive 
reorganization procedure as of 1999, when the Insolvenzordung en-
acted in 1994238 takes effect, and subsumes the two existing bank-
ruptcy statutes. 239 Although the statute was explicitly derived from 
the American Chapter 11, it differs in striking and revealing respects. 
For instance, the German provision provides for a firm's managers to 
be replaced by an administrator,240 and every case must begin as a 
liquidation.24 1 Moreover, a request by creditors to liquidate the firm 
explicitly trumps any reorganization plan. 242 Despite the fanfare at-
tending the new statute,243 German bankruptcy law clearly will retain 
its harsh, manager-displacing character even after the reforms take 
effect, and the general pattern of ex ante governance will remain fully 
in place. 
From the perspectives of our three institutional factors, the 
evolution of German corporate governance looks broadly similar to the 
evolution of Japanese corporate governance. Banks and corporate 
managers have had particular influence and the interests of labor 
have been addressed in a way that preserves the influence of concen-
trated banks. The ideological backdrop-a general tolerance of con-
centration, aversion to failure, and concern for the status of employ-
ees-can also be seen as broadly similar. 
But there are some intriguing differences as well. First, the 
government has somewhat less of an ongoing role in Germany than in 
235. See The Vergleichsordnung of 1935, v. 2.26.1935 (RGBL I S.321); Schiess!, supra note 
231, at 238. 
236. It applies only if a company can pay a substantial percentage of its unsecured obliga-
tions and must be invoked within three weeks of the time when a firm's managers become 
aware of its insolvency. See Schiess!, supra note 231, at 238-39. 
237. See id. at 239. 
238. See Bundesgesetzblatt, v. 1994 (BGBL I 8.2866). 
239. For a good description, see Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act: 
Insolvenzordnang, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 417 (1996). 
240. See id. at 426. 
241. See id. at 424. 
242 . See id. at 430. 
243 . Interestingly, insolvency practitioners vigorously opposed the changes, apparently 
because the new statute will shift power from an administrator to a firm's creditors. See id. at 
435. 
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Japan,244 which suggests that German firms may have somewhat 
more freedom from governmental policy concerns. Second, while 
Germany, like Japan, has a tradition of centralized rule, its politics 
now are more federalized-localities have significant influence. In 
view of this, one could imagine local interests taking aim at banks 
and large business, as in the United States. For the most part, how-
ever, they have not. This may be because large firms are a source of 
tax revenues and of stable employment for the communities in which 
they are located. 245 
Further, the historical conditions from which the existing 
German framework emerged may reinforce the disinclination to at-
tack bank concentration. In addition to the manager-displacing orien-
tation of German bankruptcy law, another impediment to enacting a 
more flexible regime is the rigid adherence to the absolute priority 
rule, which makes it difficult to preserve a stake for shareholders. 
The commitment to absolute priority reflects a view that banks and 
other creditors, rather than shareholders, financed German corpora-
tions after World War II, and thus that shareholders have no moral 
right to share in any bankruptcy recovery. 246 
As these differences suggest, the ex ante systems in Japan and 
Germany are a reflection of the distinct histories of the two countries. 
The histories underscore that neither ex ante nor ex post govemance is 
economically inevitable. 
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
The preceding Parts have explored the distinct approaches to 
corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy in ex ante and ex post 
regimes, first in the abstract and then in historical terms. The rapid 
growth of international markets in recent years raises the obvious 
question of whether the current striking distinctions will endure. Are 
the different governance systems stable, or will each evolve in an ex 
post or ex ante direction, or toward some intermediate framework? 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the analysis that follows sug-
gests that the current patterns will prove remarkably stable. 
244. Germany lacks the tradition of Administrative Guidance and Japanese firms' pattern 
of appointing ex-bureaucrats to their boards of directors. See supra note 69 and accompanying 
text (describing Administrative Guidance). 
245. See Backhaus, supra note 232, at 16 (describing the symbiotic relationship between 
corporations and local communities). 
246 . Conversation with Professor Fritz Kubler (Dec. 1997). 
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Particularly in the nations we have considered, the prospects for 
significant change from the status quo seem quite limited absent a 
transformation of existing institutional constraints. My prediction 
that American corporate governance will retain its ex post character, 
and that Japan and Germany will remain ex ante systems, leads us 
back to the crucial question of whether one of the approaches is likely 
to be more efficient. 
A. How Stable are the Ex Ante and Ex Post Systems? 
The question of whether existing governance systems are sta-
ble raises two closely related issues. The first is whether the legal 
and political constraints that helped to produce the existing frame-
work will eventually disappear. Will the New Deal restrictions on 
financial intermediaries erode in the United States, for instance, and 
how would their removal affect American corporate governance? 
Second, even apart from systemic change, can or will firms them-
selves contract around the existing framework or evade it in other 
ways? The analysis that follows will consider each of these questions, 
starting once again with the United States. 
1. Institutional Stability Against the Odds 
Enormous pressure has mounted in recent years to roll back 
many of the New Deal financial reforms, in large part because they 
increasingly hamper the competitiveness of banks against alternative 
forms of financing, such as issuing commercial paper. 247 Banks now 
have broad flexibility to branch across state lines, 248 and the Glass-
Steagall barriers separating commercial and investment banking 
have eroded in significant respects.249 At the same time, other institu-
tional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds, and pen-
247. The irony of commercial banks' predicament is that the New Deal reforms initially as-
sured banks almost continuous profits, since they gave commercial banks a virtual monopoly 
over traditional banking activities such as making loans. But as alternative forms of financing 
proliferated, commercial banks' inability to engage in activities such as underwriting dimin-
ished their ability to compete. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P . Miller, Bank Failures, Risk 
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1169-71 (1988). 
248. The Riegle-Neal Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.) will allow unlimited branching except in states that opt out of its provi-
sions. For a good description of the Act and its effect, see Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking 
and Branching under the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARv. J . ON LEGIS. 183 (1996). 
249. Most prominently, the Federal Reserve has adopted a series of regulations easing the 
restrictions on commercial banks' ability to acquire investment-banking subsidiaries (referred to 
as "Section 20 subsidiaries"). The trend has triggered a flurry of acquisition activity. 
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sion funds have accumulated increasingly large equity stakes in many 
U.S. corporations. 250 
While these developments have already had significant effects, 
it would be a mistake to conclude they will lead in easy steps to 
Japanese or German-style corporate governance. In banking, for 
instance, interest groups such as local bankers that supported efforts 
to fragment large banks would continue to oppose bank concentration. 
The New Deal reforms also gave other interest groups-investment 
banks and insurance companies, for instance-a strong interest in the 
status quo. 251 The influence of these groups, together with the contin-
ued antipathy toward concentrated banks, makes it unlikely that 
United States banks will achieve anything like the influence their 
counterparts wield in Japan and Germany. 252 
In contrast to banks, other institutional investors have taken a 
more active role in corporate governance. Public pensions such as 
CALPers, for instance, helped to remove the chief executives of sev-
eral prominent corporations. Yet institutional investors as a whole 
have strong disincentives to engage in active relational governance.253 
The picture in bankruptcy is similar in many respects, but far 
more strongly aligned in favor of the status quo. In recent years, an 
increasing number of commentators have excoriated the perceived 
inefficiency of Chapter 11-style reorganization. 254 Based on recent 
insights in corporate finance, most have proposed some form of liqui-
dation-based bankruptcy framework that would displace managers (or 
250. A 1991 study found that institutional investors hold 53 percent of all the publicly 
traded stock in U.S. corporations. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise 
of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827 n.27 (1992); C. BRANCATO & P. 
GAUGHAN, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE, tbl.lO (Columbia 
Law School Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law and Economic Studies, Sept. 1991). 
251. In recent years, lobbying by insurance companies has been the single most visible 
impediment to the elimination of Glass-Steagall Act barriers on the products banks can offer. 
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, House G.O.P. Narrowing Bill on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
1995, at D1 (insurance companies successfully resist broad bill that would have reversed Glass-
Steagall). 
252. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 65 (expressing a similar view). 
253. An enormous amount of literature has developed around the question of whether 
institutional investors should or will play an active role in American corporate governance in 
coming years. The first to note the disincentives faced by institutions other than public pension 
funds was Ed Rock. See Rock, supra note 54. Bernie Black developed his more optimistic view 
in a series of articles that began appearing at the same time. See Black, supra note 21; Black, 
supra note 250. The most recent contribution is Thomas Smith's argument that institutional 
investors' passivity stems less from political and legislative obstacles than from their customers' 
desire that the institutions eschew risk. See Smith, supra note 27. 
254. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for references to some of this literature. 
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at the least, seriously destabilize their authority) as an alternative to 
the current regime. 255 
The existing institutional dynamic is so heavily biased in favor 
of an ex post approach to corporate bankruptcy, however, that it is 
difficult to imagine significant legislative change. The most promi-
nent interest group, bankruptcy lawyers , has strong professional 
incentives to preserve Chapter 11 in its current form, as do bank-
ruptcy judges. 256 If Chapter 11 is as inefficient as many commentators 
believe, one might expect creditors to lobby for reform. Yet, because 
creditors pass on the effects of inefficiency or increased efficiency to 
their borrowers, the principal interest of the creditors is in the transi-
tion costs of reform. 257 As a result, unless their sunk costs are unusu-
ally high, creditors have often been more interested in streamlining 
the existing system than with seeking significant reform. 258 
Ideological factors strongly reinforce the American tendency 
toward manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy. At least 
since the nineteenth century railroad receiverships, the background 
ideology has favored a reorganization option rather than simply 
liquidating distressed firms. 259 
Notice that the stability of ex post bankruptcy also has a stabi-
lizing effect on the market-driven nature of American corporate law. 
In addition to the other reasons to doubt any imminent shift toward 
Japanese or German-style governance, the existence of a manager-
driven reorganization option undermines the effectiveness of the large 
stake-holdings that characterize an ex ante regime, and diminishes 
managers' need to invite the intrusion of large, active shareholders. 260 
255. See sources cited supra note 50; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra 
note 175. 
256. This is not to suggest that bankruptcy attorneys' or judges' motives are in any way 
malignant. Most believe strongly in the virtues of the existing framework, but this belief 
inevitably is conditioned by their own practice. See KOMESAR, supra note 104, at 58-65 
(discussing the relationship between institutional constraints and motive). 
257. For a more detailed discussion, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the 
Shape of American Bankruptcy, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming, 1998). 
258. Another context where creditors may take an active interest is where a proposed 
change may affect their market share vis-a-vis a competing form of credit. For evidence of this 
in connection with the 1978 Code, see Posner, supra note 150, at 76 (banks supported limited 
right of redemption, which could undermine interests of commercial finance companies); see also 
Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 631-
36 (1995) (describing competing lobbying interests of banks and finance companies). 
259. Structural factors similarly favor the existing ex post framework. Not only have the 
original constitutional obstacles to reorganization disappeared, but the current framework also 
gives bankruptcy judges and the bankruptcy bar an enormous stake in its survival. 
260. See supra Part II.B (discussing importance of manager-displacing bankruptcy to ex 
ante governance, due to the leverage it gives relational investors). 
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In sum, while American corporate governance, like that of 
other nations, is subject to continual, limited variation through time, 
its general ex post character appears to be remarkably stable. 
2. Evading the Framework Through Private Ordering 
Even if dramatic change in U.S. corporate governance is 
unlikely, individual firms may nevertheless devise alternative struc-
tures through private ordering. It is therefore important to consider 
how easily firms can or do opt out of the relevant system. There are 
significant limitations on the ease and the benefits of opting out. 
In a much discussed article written at the end of the 1980s 
takeover boom, Michael Jensen argued that in maturing industries, 
American firms increasingly would opt out of traditional govemance 
pattems by eschewing the Berle-Means corporation in favor of con-
centrated shareholding by entrepreneurial managers. 261 The rise of 
Leveraged Buyout ("LBO") firms provided his principal illustration. 
LBO partnerships, such as Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts, acquire firms 
through takeovers and then install their own managers or give the 
existing managers compensation packages that are closely tied to 
performance. By reducing the separation between ownership and 
control, LBO firms diminish managerial agency costs and seem to 
offer a dramatically more efficient altemative to the traditional 
publicly held firm. 262 
While LBO firms have figured prominently in American corpo-
rate law, they have had little of the transformative effect Jensen envi-
sioned. This is due in part to difficulties in finding suitable takeover 
targets. 263 Moreover, because the partners of an LBO firm cannot 
themselves manage all of the companies, the firm must delegate 
managerial responsibility, which at least partially reintroduces 
managerial agency cost problems. 264 Finally, the heavy concentration 
261. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 
1989, at 61. 
262. See id. at 68-70; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies 
as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 985 (1993) (discussing Swedish analogue to LBO associations and the obstacles to such a 
strategy in the United States). 
263. This difficulty is magnified by state anti-takeover statutes, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent by Delaware's takeover jurisprudence, each of which make it more costly to pursue a 
hostile bid. Roberta Romano's extensive review of existing studies found that bidders make 
relatively low profits on average from takeovers. See Romano, supra note 204. 
264. The performance-based incentives LBO firms give to managers significantly enhance 
their accountability, as Jensen notes, see Jensen, supra note 261, at 68-69; but the managers 
still are managers rather than full owners of the firm. 
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of debt required to finance the initial acquisition significantly con-
strains managerial flexibility. In practice, LBO firms have often 
taken their companies public after restructuring them, serving as a 
transition vehicle rather than an alternative to the Berle-Means cor-
poration.265 
The LBO firms illustrate some of the practical obstacles to 
concentrated shareholding in a regulatory regime that thwarts the 
most likely candidate, financial intermediaries, from playing this role. 
Moreover, successfully opting out of ex post governance would require 
not just concentrated shareholding, but also that the firm commit 
itself to not invoke the Bankruptcy Code's reorganization option.z66 
Yet, much as with concentrated shareholding, there are major practi-
cal and legal obstacles to foregoing the reorganization-based bank-
ruptcy regime. 
The chief obstacle to opting out of Chapter 11 is the longstand-
ing rule that debtors cannot waive their right to file a bankruptcy 
petition.267 Courts have sometimes enforced efforts to opt out of the 
Code, but the exceptions have been limited to contexts far afield of 
publicly held firms. 268 For a publicly held firm, opting out would at a 
265. For a suggestion that Money Trust banks such as J.P. Morgan and Company played 
an intriguingly similar role (though without taking as large an equity stake) early in the 
century, see Charles F. Sabel, Comment, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at 
243-46 (commenting on DeLong, supra note 22). 
266. Jensen has suggested that LBO firms would structure the firms they acquire in such a 
way as to "privatize" bankruptcy. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LEO's, and the 
Privatization of Bankruptcy, J . APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1989, at 34, 41-44. But, as the 
discussion below suggests, it is all but impossible to insulate a firm from Chapter 11 if it has 
any outside shareholders. Even if this were not the case, devising a firm's capital structure 
principally to avoid the need for Chapter 11 is an odd strategy for an operating firm. 
Interestingly, Morgan appears to have been fully aware of the destabilizing effect corporate 
reorganization has on ex ante governance. The Morgan partners took extraordinary steps to 
keep the firms they monitored from defaulting. See Sabel, supra note 265, at 246. 
267. See, e.g. , Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (no waiver); In re Peli , 31 
Bankr. 952, 956 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (no waiver). 
268. A growing number of cases have addressed the question of whether to enforce a pre-
bankruptcy waiver of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. Enforcing such a provision 
enables a creditor to foreclose immediately, despite the bankruptcy filing. The cases thus far 
have nearly all involved individuals or very small firms who agreed to the provision in connec-
tion with a pre-bankruptcy workout. For an argument that stay waivers should be enforceable 
if adequate notice is provided to other creditors, see Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 97-101 
(1995), and Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, 
and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 335-39 (1997). 
In addition to stay waivers, there is also growing interest in the issue of whether structured 
finance transactions can be insulated from bankruptcy. But these transactions generally 
involve only a subset of a firm's assets (usually receivables), and do not directly affect the ability 
of the firm itself to file for bankruptcy. For a discussion of these issues, and proposed standards 
for determining whether firms can opt out of bankruptcy, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Freedom to 
Contract About Bankruptcy (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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minimum require that a firm secure the direct or indirect consent of 
each of its creditors. This is a particularly difficult obstacle for large 
firms. z69 
One can imagine clever ways to attempt to evade the non-
waivability of bankruptcy. For example, prior to going public, a firm 
might adopt a provision requiring unanimous consent of its directors 
as a prerequisite to filing for bankruptcy.270 Yet such a provision 
could not prevent an involuntary filing, and a shareholder could argue 
that the directors' fiduciary duties compelled them to file for 
bankruptcy.271 It is not without reason that bankruptcy practitioners 
believe they can navigate any substantial firm into Chapter 11. 
In short, American firms that attempt to opt out of the ex post 
governance system face enormous practical and legal obstacles. The 
obstacles are not absolute; some publicly held firms do deviate from 
the Berle-Means model, and some can at least partially limit the 
availability of Chapter 11. But the vast majority of large firms re-
main fully within the ex post framework of generally passive share-
holders and retain a reorganization option in the event of financial 
distress. 
3. Reform or Opting Out in Japan and Germany 
In both Japan and Germany, there are similarly powerful con-
straints on opting out. On the corporate governance side, perhaps the 
largest obstacle to opting out is financing. The same banks that hold 
large stakes in industrial corporations are also the primary source of 
financing. 272 In consequence, a firm that seeks to keep its bank at 
arms-length would seriously limit its access to capital. To be sure, the 
269. It is especially difficult when involuntary creditors are taken into account, given that 
they by definition do not have an opportunity to consent. 
270. This is one of the strategies used in structured finance . For a discussion, see STEVEN 
L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AsSET SECURITIZATION 16-
24 (1990). 
271. Even if most or all of the directors represent a constituency committed to avoiding 
Chapter 11, their duties as directors require them to act in the best interests of the firm. This 
may therefore obligate them to file for bankruptcy. 
The ongoing Marvel bankruptcy illustrates yet another strategy. In Marvel, the bank-
ruptcy court permitted the firm's bondholders (led by Carl Icahn) to foreclose on the stock 
pledged to secure their bonds. The effect of this has been to give the bondholders control of the 
case, much as creditors controlled many equity receiverships earlier in this century. This does 
not mean that creditors can routinely use stock pledges to foreclose a debtor's Chapter 11 
option. The foreclosure in Marvel required court approval, which in many cases would not be 
given, and the bondholders still must use the Chapter 11 process in their own effort to 
reorganize. For a discussion of Marvel and its complexities, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy 
Courts and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1998). 
272. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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securities markets in both Japan and Germany have expanded sig-
nificantly in recent years, so that banks no longer have quite the 
stranglehold on finance that they enjoyed in the past. In Japan, 
moreover, many and perhaps most of the principal banks have been in 
deep financial trouble themselves in recent years. Even so, banks are 
still sufficiently dominant that firms which resist bank oversight 
would put themselves at a competitive disadvantage. 273 
On the bankruptcy side, there is no existing interest group in 
either Japan or Germany that seems likely to mirror the role that the 
bankruptcy bar and bankruptcy judges play in promoting manager-
driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy in the United States. 274 
Moreover, banks are a powerful interest group in both countries, and 
they have a vested interest in manager-displacing bankruptcy as a 
means of solidifying their influence in corporate governance. 275 In an 
ex ante framework, there is no obvious need for a well-developed 
bankruptcy regime, manager-driven or otherwise. Because a few 
large creditors often hold most of a firm's debt, the kinds of collective 
action problems that serve as the principal justification for American 
bankruptcy law276 arguably do not exist. 
As with American firms, the path of least resistance is to ac-
cede to the existing framework, and the vast majority of large 
Japanese and German firms do just that. 
273. A similar analysis would apply for non-bank keiretsu in Japan. A firm that resisted 
the influence of a main bank, and also avoided the extensive cross-holdings-and cross-con-
trol--of a non-bank keiretsu, would face a major competitive disadvantage. 
An interesting question is whether Japanese and German corporations will begin to look 
less to local securities markets and more to international ones as an alternative to relational 
monitoring. For instance, Japanese and German firms could quite plausibly issue stock in the 
United States. Thus far, relatively few firms have taken this step. One possible explanation is 
that managers are comfortable with the existing approach, perhaps in part because they can 
minimize intervention by keeping the relational monitors happy. Cultural factors may also play 
a role. 
274. More precisely, neither country has nearly so substantial and powerful a bankruptcy 
bar as does the United States. In both countries, the bankruptcy process is far more adminis-
trative, and lawyers do not play a substantial role. 
275. As discussed earlier, see supra Part IV.B, Germany has recently added a chapter 11-
like reorganization provision. Like Japan's reorganization chapter, it assumes the removal of 
existing managers and thus will function as a manager-displacing bankruptcy regime. 
276. In contemporary American bankruptcy scholarship, Thomas Jackson (and his frequent 
co-author Douglas Baird) has argued most forcefully that bankruptcy is best justified as a 
response to the collective action problems faced by a firm's widely-scattered creditors. See, e.g., 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). 
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B. Which System is Better? Comparing Ex Ante and Ex Post 
The likely stability of the American, Japanese, and German 
corporate governance frameworks brings us to a question that has 
lurked beneath the analysis almost from the beginning. Which of the 
two frameworks is superior-or would some intermediate approach 
prove more efficient than either ex ante or ex post governance? 
While carefully hedging the comparisons, several of the initial 
efforts to compare Japanese and German relational governance to the 
Berle-Means corporation in the United States seemed particularly 
enamored of the Japanese and German approach. 277 An important 
attraction of large stakeholders is that they have a greater incentive 
to engage in ongoing monitoring of managers than do American 
shareholders.278 In addition, these stakeholders' ongoing relationships 
with the firms may facilitate more extensive exchange of information 
between the firms and the shareholders, and promote a long-term 
focus not possible for market-driven American firms. In addition to 
these advantages there is the attraction of manager-displacing 
bankruptcy. Creditor control and the absence of a manager-oriented 
reorganization option avoid the inefficiencies of the ex post American 
reorganization process. 
Given the influence wielded by relational creditors, the ex ante 
system depends heavily on the effectiveness of banks and other large 
stakeholders as monitors. Because banks are firms themselves, they 
face their own agency costs. Even taking these factors into account, 
however, banks may still play an important and valuable monitoring 
role.z79 
Ex ante governance thus offers significant attractions as com-
pared to the American system. Yet the Japanese and German ap-
proaches also have an important downside: both create powerful 
incentives to avoid even beneficial risk-taking. 280 A firm's relational 
277. For a similar reading of this work, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P . Miller, 
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, 
Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 74 (1995) ("[d]espite some protestations of 
agnosticism, [the tone of advocates of the political account of corporate governance] makes it 
clear that they regard the American system ... as inferior") (citing, among others: Roe, Some 
Differences, supra note 36, at 1997; Black, supra note 250, at 813-14; Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 
127 (1994)). 
278. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
279. See, e.g., ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 11 ("[a]s long as the intermediaries' 
debilities are not the same debilities affiicting the industrial firms in which they own 
stock .. . then there might be improvements"). 
280. Macey and Miller reach a similar conclusion. See Macey & Miller, supra note 277. 
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bank 1s the first and most obvious source of this risk averswn. 
Because Japanese and German banks, unlike their American coun-
terparts, hold stock as well as debt, they theoretically could encourage 
better decision making than a holder of stock or debt alone. 281 In prac-
tice, however, banks tend to hold a much higher percentage of a firm's 
debt than its stock, which gives them an incentive to eschew risk. 282 
The fact that the banks themselves are thinly capitalized reinforces 
their aversion to risk. 283 
The other principal source of risk aversion is the firm's manag-
ers. Due to the substantial human capital stake they have in their 
firms, managers have a natural tendency to avoid risk even apart 
from the particular dynamics of ex ante governance. 284 The draconian 
consequences of failure in the ex ante framework magnify this inclina-
tion. A manager who will immediately lose her job if the firm files for 
bankruptcy, and who faces a notably thin managerial labor market, is 
likely to view risk quite differently than one who operates in a more 
forgiving system. 
In contrast to ex ante governance, the ex post framework en-
courages a more sanguine approach to risk-taking. Because the 
shareholders of U.S. firms tend to be diversified, they benefit if the 
firm takes appropriate risks. 285 While managers may be less anxious 
to take risks, the active managerial markets and manager-driven 
281. Interestingly, requiring managers to hold both stock and debt was the strategy Jensen 
and Meckling suggested more than two decades ago as a way to address managerial agency 
costs. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 352-54. 
Based on a similar intuition, Hauswald argues that the German system, with mixed bank-
ing and a liquidation-based bankruptcy regime that makes loan agreements effectively renego-
tiation-proof, is superior to the American approach of limiting banks' ability to hold stock. See 
Financial Contracting, supra note 66; Banking Systems, supra note 66. As the analysis below 
suggests, however, this assumes that banks' stock and debt holdings are proportionate and 
ignores the effect of agency costs on the bank itself. 
282. See Macey & Miller, supra note 277, at 84-86 (Japan), 88-89 (Germany). One factor 
Macey and Miller do not take into account is the fact that a bank's ongoing interest in its bor-
rower's success gives it an equity-like stake in the borrower's future . This is true even if the 
bank holds only or predominantly a debt interest, since the firm's future success means future 
loans for the bank. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 901, 948-52 (1986) (characterizing relational bank's role as similar to a joint venturer). 
283 . An important feedback effect of ex ante governance is that it may also undermine 
entrepreneurial activity. For evidence that venture capital providers in Japan are often affili-
ated with banks and securities firms, and tend to finance retail and real estate firms rather 
than new technology, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States 
and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 865, 874-80 (1997). 
284. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 354. 
285 . Shareholders' willingness to permit risk is a function of their diversification, together 
with the effect limited liability has in controlling their downside risk. See Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). 
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bankruptcy process-together with firms' increased use of stock-based 
compensation-all work to align their perspectives with that of their 
shareholders. 
This is not to say that ex post is necessarily superior to ex ante 
governance. Just as ex ante governance tends toward risk aversion, ex 
post governance can encourage too much risk. Debtholders-the 
initial losers if a firm's risk-taking turns out badly-constrain firms 
through covenants. 286 But the covenants cannot be enforced if the 
firm files for bankruptcy. This, coupled with the fact that 
shareholders often retain some of their interest in a reorganization, 
can induce excessive risk, particularly as a firm nears insolvency. 287 
Neither the ex ante nor the ex post approach is inherently su-
perior. Rather than anointing one or the other as preferable, it is 
more useful to view them as alternative mechanisms for enhancing 
going-concern value. From this perspective, the Japanese and 
German approach tends to retain going-concern value within an exist-
ing firm. Once a firm is established, ex ante governance, with its long-
term shareholders and comparatively cautious managers, stabilizes 
the existing firm and strongly deters failure. Ex post governance, by 
contrast, places far less emphasis on the existing firm. The market-
driven governance and amenability to failure of the ex post approach 
facilitate the redeployment of existing assets. If stability is the 
watchword of an ex ante system, ex post governance assumes a certain 
amount of creative destruction. 288 
286. The classic account of this is Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial 
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). 
287. See Barry E . Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 441 
(1992). 
Recent empirical work on capital structure provides strong support for this view as to the 
differential effects of ex ante and ex post governance. Thus firms generally held much more debt 
in the United States, which offers managers the possibility of ex post reorganization, than in 
countries such as Germany that do not. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 208, at 1445. 
288. Ron Gilson has recently distinguished American and Japanese governance in some-
what similar terms. Gilson characterizes corporate governance as a trade-off between 
"stability," which tends to support firm-specific investment, and "mutability," which enables 
firms to respond quickly to changes in technology. Gilson, supra note 10, at 336. Gilson de-
scribes Japanese governance as biased toward stability and as a result best at adapting to niche 
markets, whereas American governance emphasizes mutability and adapts better to change. 
See id. at 340-42. 
The same distinction can be made by analogy to evolutionary theory in biology. 
Evolutionary biologists initially assumed that evolutionary success meant the survival of 
individual organisms. In more recent years, this view has given way to the "selfish gene" 
approach, which posits that evolutionary success consists of the successful transmission of 
particular genes into subsequent generations, even if this entails high mortality for individual 
organisms . See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989). From this perspective, 
ex ante governance parallels an organism-based approach , and ex post governance a selfish gene 
approach . 
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The effectiveness of each approach depends on the parties' 
success in counteracting its potential inefficiencies. In the United 
States, contractual provisions such as bond covenants help limit 
shareholder risk-taking. 289 Important dangers with ex ante govern-
ance include excessive risk aversion, and diversion by concentrated 
shareholders of private benefits to themselves. Bank shareholders' 
shareholdings and their stake in the ongoing success of the firm may 
partially counteract their risk aversion.290 In Japan and Germany, 
these factors, together with the threat of government intervention, 
appear to be the principal check on the downsides of ex ante govern-
ance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An evolutionary theory of corporate governance and corporate 
bankruptcy provides a more complete account of corporate law than 
even the most sophisticated existing theories. Focusing on the United 
States, Japan, and Germany, this Article has proposed that, at least 
in countries with relatively stable property rights, a nation's corporate 
governance and corporate bankruptcy approaches will invariably 
prove complementary. By considering the evolutionary history of each 
of the systems, particularly the ex post system in place in the United 
States, we were able to see how different nations' corporate law 
frameworks could diverge so dramatically, and to make predictions 
about future developments. 
Although the analysis focused on the polar cases of ex ante 
(Japan, Germany) and ex post governance (United States), the theory 
is fully applicable to other nations as well. Thus, in nations such as 
Canada and Great Britain, where corporate governance is more rela-
tional than the United States but more market-driven than Japan 
289. Notice that shareholders as well as bondholders benefit from provisions that limit the 
agency costs of equity, since bondholders would otherwise demand higher interest rates to offset 
the risk of ex post risk-taking by shareholders. 
290. In contexts where the same institution does not serve both as the principal sharehold-
er and the principal debtholder, one might expect an increased concentration of shareholding to 
provoke an analogous concentration in debtholding, since large creditors can more effectively 
monitor a concentrated shareholder than scattered creditors. Stated differently, large creditors 
have both a sufficient stake and sufficient access to information to counterbalance large share-
holders. These factors help to explain both the tendency of closely held American firms to have 
a single dominant creditor and the concentration of debt (which parallels the newly concen-
trated equity) in most leveraged buyout transactions. 
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and Germany, 291 there are also intermediate approaches to corporate 
bankruptcy. 292 
It is important not to overstate the importance of corporate law 
in a nation's economic development. Technology and external price 
shocks may prove far more important than corporate law in determin-
ing the success of a corporate enterprise. But at least on the margin, 
the corporate law framework does make a difference-in the effect it 
has on entrepreneurial activity and on the preservation of going-
concern values, for instance. So long as it does, it is important to 
continue to refine our understanding of the corporate governance 
patterns that have emerged in any given country. 293 
291. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Brittania?: Institutional 
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994) (noting 
shareholdings more concentrated in Britain than United States, but institutional shareholders 
do not routinely monitor); Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 68, at 884-88 (describing 
concentrated shareholdings in Canadian firms). 
292. Thus, George Triantis' valuable work comparing bankruptcy in Canada and the 
United States suggests the Canadian framework includes a genuine reorganization option but is 
far more stringent about applying it. See Triantis, supra note 59; see also LoPucki & Triantis, 
supra note 120. Consistent with this, one would expect to find that Canadian managers are less 
highly paid than their American counterparts, that their pay is less likely to include a substan-
tial performance-based component, and that Canadian firms include less debt in their capital 
structures. 
293. One important area for future refinement is to map more precisely the relationship 
between private actors and representatives of governmental agencies. The theory could be 
extended to governance systems where the government not only influences corporate govern-
ance, as in Japan and Germany, but exercises a direct ownership interest, as has been true in 
France. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French 
Enterprises (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing changes in French 
governance). In such a governance system, corporate managers are likely to take on some of the 
characteristics of agency bureaucrats. 
